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Abstract 
Rozin and colleagues’ CAD model (1999) proposed that violations of three 
different moral domains (community, autonomy, and divinity) each elicit a 
specific emotional response (contempt, anger, and disgust). Moral Foundations 
Theory (MFT; Haidt & Joseph, 2007) is a five-factor moral taxonomy derived 
from the three moral domains used in the CAD study. This thesis investigates 
whether the CAD model fully applies to MFT, regarding both state and trait 
emotions.  In keeping with the CAD model, previous research found that state 
anger relates to harm and fairness violations (autonomy), and that both state and 
trait disgust relate to purity violations (divinity; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & 
Cohen, 2009). However, no study has empirically tested whether the loyalty and 
authority foundations (community) relate to state or trait contempt. This gap in the 
literature was investigated across two studies. Study 1 used a correlational design 
that primarily focused on the development of a new comprehensive trait contempt 
instrument and construct; exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses indicated 
that the instrument’s items formed factors that matched their predicted structure, 
and that each of these factors contributed strongly to a latent trait contempt 
construct. To test the convergent and discriminant validity of the new instrument, 
participants completed previously developed instruments that assess trait anger, 
trait disgust, and trait contempt (Crowley, 2013; Izard et al., 1993). However, a 
principle components analysis that included these instruments did not fully 
support the new instrument’s discriminant validity, as trait anger and disgust did 
not form separate factors from trait contempt but rather loaded onto dimensions of 
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trait contempt relating to other-criticalness. Finally, in order to test whether trait 
contempt predicts loyalty and authority values, participants completed the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). Contrary to expectations, trait 
contempt was not associated with authority, and was negatively associated with 
loyalty values. Study 2, a within-subjects experiment, used contempt’s unique 
facial expression as a way to assess contempt’s relation to MFT. Participants 
engaged in a facial expression-rating task: They read short scenarios featuring 
violations of the five moral foundations, and then rated photos of contempt, anger, 
and disgust facial expressions according to how strongly they felt each emotion. 
Study 2 appears to be the first study to use a facial expression photo paradigm 
(similar to Rozin et al., 1999) to test the relations between the CAD emotions and 
MFT. Contrary to predictions, although contempt was significantly associated 
with loyalty and authority violations, this association was not unique, as contempt 
was statistically similar to both anger and disgust across all moral violations 
except purity. Participants also completed the trait contempt instrument from 
Study 1; this was done to test whether overall contempt expression ratings could 
be used as an alternate measure of trait contempt. However, contempt expression 
ratings were not significantly associated with trait contempt, either across or 
within scenario types.  Finally, Study 2 tested the relation between trait contempt 
and immorality judgments towards loyalty and authority foundation violations; 
trait contempt was not significantly associated with either. Although hypotheses 
pertaining to the CAD model and MFT were disconfirmed, this thesis makes 
several contributions. The development of a comprehensive trait contempt 
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construct and instrument may provide opportunities for a wide range of future 
studies. Trait contempt may predict behaviors such as discrimination and attitudes 
such as prejudice, social dominance orientation, and political ideology. Studies 1 
and 2 were also the first to comprehensively test both contempt and trait 
contempt’s relation to moral foundation theory; their results may cast some doubt 
on the original CAD study’s findings. Finally, this study’s findings contribute a 
greater understanding of the link between personality, emotion, and moral values.  
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Introduction 
 Imagine an individual who is always complaining about people that do not 
live up to his minimum expectations of how people ought to behave or ought to 
be.  He is almost hyper-vigilant of idiotic and careless strangers, selfish and 
inconsiderate drivers, incompetent service people, and spiteful coworkers. When 
someone violates what he sees as important unwritten social rules, his first 
response is to quickly, but quietly, attribute it to their stupidity - or some other 
fundamental personality defect. He feels surrounded by “morons,” “screw-ups,” 
and “jerks.”  He is quick to lose respect and empathy for such people, and treats 
them coldly when he does. He frequently complains about such people’s social 
rule-breaking behaviors and personality flaws to friends and acquaintances 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). However, those listening to these complaints may 
view many of the described behaviors as somewhat trivial, and may rarely even 
notice such behaviors occurring in their own day to day lives (Spielberger, 1996). 
This individual’s attitudes often imply an exasperated sense of superiority over 
most people – “If I can live up to these minimum standards of behavior, why can’t 
they?” 
 How might this pattern of emotional, cognitive, and behavioral responses 
be characterized? Some might generally describe this individual as grouchy, 
irritable, or judgmental. However, in psychological terms, this person would best 
be characterized as being particularly prone towards feeling the emotion of 
contempt – perhaps best described as cold feelings of dislike combined with 
negative character judgments and a loss of warmth, empathy, and respect (Fischer 
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& Roseman, 2007; Miller, 1997). Specifically, such an individual would be very 
high in trait contempt – or a predisposition towards feeling contempt more easily, 
frequently, and intensely than the average person (Izard et al., 1993; Spielberger, 
1996).  
 How might high levels of trait contempt affect this person’s life, mind, and 
attitudes? Trait contempt might be expected to affect things such as mood, life 
satisfaction, interpersonal relationships, pessimism, and conflict (Crowley, 2013). 
However, less intuitively, it may be the case that this person’s high level of trait 
contempt may predict the endorsement of certain types of moral values. 
Specifically, indirect evidence from the moral emotion literature indicates that 
high levels of trait contempt might predict an increased concern over moral values 
relating to: tradition, hierarchy, adherence to social roles, respect towards 
authority, loyalty to one’s in-group, and the intense dislike of those who violate or 
oppose such values (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt et al, 2009; Rozin et al., 1999; 
Shweder et al., 1997). 
 However, any attempt to study trait contempt and its relation to values and 
ideology features a significant obstacle: contempt has received relatively little 
comprehensive attention by researchers, in comparison to other emotions (Haidt, 
2003). More importantly, the concept of trait contempt has received hardly any 
attention at all, and remains ill-defined. As such, a contemporary and 
comprehensive definition of contempt as an emotion, and trait contempt as a 
construct, must be developed. Furthermore, in order to investigate the link 
between trait contempt and moral values, the development of a contemporary trait 
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contempt instrument is required. This is because the only other seemingly 
available instrument is 20 years old (Izard et al., 1993), and does not incorporate 
several important findings from the more recent contempt literature. Specifically, 
this older trait contempt instrument (1993) may not sufficiently incorporate 
contempt’s unique elicitors, action tendencies, and affective experience (Fischer 
& Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).   
 In order to provide sufficient background for the proposed link between 
trait contempt and moral values, several areas of the literature will be reviewed. 
This will include past and contemporary literature on moral values, moral 
emotions, and the link between negative emotions and specific types of moral 
values. This will be followed by an explanation of a gap in the moral emotion 
literature, and how trait contempt may explain this gap. However, because both 
contempt and trait contempt remain ill-defined, additional areas of the emotion 
literature will be reviewed. This review will include the functionalist model of 
emotion, previous literature on contempt, methodological problems – and 
solutions to - assessing contempt, a contemporary definition of contempt, and the 
concept of trait emotions. Synthesizing these elements, a contemporary definition 
of contempt as an emotion, and trait contempt as a construct, will then be 
developed.  
Past Perspectives on Morality 
For many years, psychological researchers defined morality almost 
exclusively in terms of fairness, harm, or help towards individual people, while 
treating any potentially group-based moral values as either immature moral 
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reasoning, or as mere social convention (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt, 
2003; Kohlberg, 1969; Turiel, 1983). Additionally, this line of research focused 
on how people developed or exercised moral reasoning, largely to the exclusion 
of any potential moral emotions, other than empathy or guilt (Haidt, 2003). For 
example, Kohlberg (1969) defined moral development almost exclusively in 
terms of increasingly sophisticated notions of justice (i.e. fairness). Turiel (1983) 
defined morality exclusively in terms of rights, justice, and welfare (i.e. fairness 
and harm). And indeed, the vast majority of morality research has focused almost 
exclusively on reasoning about harm and fairness towards individuals (Haidt, 
2003, 2012). However, contemporary perspectives have expanded the moral 
domain beyond this limited scope to include processes besides reasoning, values 
besides harm and fairness, and moral units besides the individual (Haidt 2003, 
2012).   
Contemporary Perspectives on Morality: Group-Level Moral Values  
During the last two decades there has been a significant paradigm shift in 
theoretical perspectives on morality. Research has increasingly shown that there is 
significant variability in both the range and defining characteristics of morality 
(Haidt, 2003; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park 1997). Increasing attention has 
been paid to a wide array of moral emotions, rather than moral reasoning, as a 
significant driver of moral judgment (Haidt, 2003, 2012; Rozin et al., 1999). 
Additionally, increasing attention has been paid to different types of moral values 
which place the group, community, or society as the locus of morality, rather than 
the individual (Graham et al., 2009; Shweder et al., 1997).  In regards to the latter, 
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two major theories have strongly influenced the increasing acknowledgement of 
group moral values as part of the moral domain. These two major theories are 
Shweder’s three ethics (Shweder et al., 1997) and Haidt’s Moral Foundations 
Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Haidt et al., 2009). 
Shweder’s Three Ethics. One of the first to articulate a broadened, 
group-level moral domain was Shweder, who described three major ethics: 
autonomy, community, and divinity (Shweder et al., 1997). Shweder found that 
Westerners tended to define morality almost exclusively via an ethic of autonomy: 
morality was almost exclusively defined in terms of harming or helping 
individuals, and treating them fairly. Autonomy violations are violations of 
freedom or rights: in other words, an action is a moral violation if it causes harm 
to another individual or if an individual is treated unjustly (Rozin et al., 1999). 
Key concepts that fit with the ethic of autonomy include justice, fairness, 
freedom, rights, liberty, and independence (Shweder et al., 1997; Rozin et al., 
1999). And indeed, this moral perspective closely matched the theories of 
Kohlberg (1969) and Turiel (1983). However, Shweder found that populations 
from non-western cultures often had a broader conception of the moral domain, 
which included not only the individual-level ethic of autonomy, but also two 
group-level moral values as well: the ethics of community and divinity (Shweder 
et al., 1997).  
The ethic of community emphasizes moral values that relate to 
maintaining social harmony, protecting cultural institutions and the in-group’s 
interests as if they were one’s own, and respecting or maintaining well-defined 
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social roles and hierarchy (Shweder et al., 1997). Moral violations of the ethic of 
community occur when people fail to carry out their duties to the community or to 
the hierarchy they belong to, or when they fail to live up to others’ expectations. 
Key concepts that fit into the ethic of community include obligation, duty, 
authority, respect, and interdependence (Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 1997). 
The ethic of divinity characterizes humans as spiritual beings, and 
emphasizes reverence for the sacred, tradition, and the natural order of things 
(Shweder et al., 1997). The ethic of divinity is also characterized by the 
condemnation or avoidance of people or behaviors which are seen as taboo, 
carnal, dirty, degrading, undignified, animalistic, or impure (Shweder et al., 
1997). Divinity violations occur when people disrespect sacred or holy things, or 
cause degradation or spiritual contamination to the self. Key concepts of the ethic 
of divinity include purity, restraint, self-control, abstinence or chastity, sin, 
pollution, unnaturalness, degradation, defilement (Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et 
al., 1997).  
In populations characterized by increased valuation of these group-level 
ethics, Shweder found that rules and restrictions pertaining to these values were 
not considered mere culturally relative social conventions: rather, they were 
considered universal moral mandates (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder, 
Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). That is to say, acting in violation of the norms and 
rules of community and divinity values is considered a severe moral 
transgression, even if no people are harmed by the act and the action is done 
privately (Haidt et al., 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987). When first 
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presented, Shweder’s three ethics made a significant contribution to the moral 
values literature by describing the prevalence of group-level values in addition to 
individual-level values. However, contemporary research has expanded his ideas 
to provide more detailed insight into the variations humans have in their moral 
values (Shweder et al., 1997; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).  
Moral Foundations Theory. A more recent theoretical perspective has 
had a large impact on the moral values literature; this perspective is known as 
Moral Foundations Theory, and is largely derived from Shweder’s three ethics 
(Graham et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2009). Specifically, it 
expands the three ethics into five moral foundations (Graham, et al., 2009). The 
ethic of autonomy has been split into two foundations: the harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity foundations (Haidt et al., 2009). Similarly, the ethic of 
community has been split into two foundations: in-group/loyalty and 
authority/respect. Finally, the divinity foundation has been renamed as the purity 
foundation, and covers an expanded range of concepts. Shweder’s theories are 
largely compatible with Moral Foundations Theory, although the five factor 
model of morality has been shown to provide more explanatory power than 
Shweder’s three factor model (Haidt et al., 2009). 
For ease of reference, the literature has generally referred to harm/care and 
fairness/reciprocity as the individualizing foundations, whereas it has referred to 
authority, loyalty, and purity as the socially binding foundations.  Individualizing 
foundations focus on individuals as the central moral unit (Haidt, 2008; Haidt et 
al., 2009). In contrast, socially binding foundations focus on groups as the central 
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moral unit, emphasizing that the values centered on institutions and social roles 
are important in regulating selfishness: i.e. binding people to these communities 
and roles (Haidt, 2008; Haidt et al., 2009). That is to say, these three foundations 
bind individuals into groups, communities, and societies via in-group loyalties, 
respect for social roles and the social order, and self-control (Haidt et al., 2009). 
Individualizing foundations: Harm and fairness. The harm/care 
foundation is concerned with the suffering of the self and others (Haidt et al., 
2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Its virtues (i.e. care) include concepts such as 
empathy, concern, compassion, and a moral imperative to not harm others (Haidt 
et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004).Violations of this foundation (i.e. harm) are 
acts of cruelty, brutality, violence, harming life or limb, etc. (Haidt et al., 2009). 
The fairness/reciprocity foundation is concerned with social equality and 
proportionality (Haidt, 2012). Fairness pertains to the self and others being treated 
fairly and equally, while reciprocity pertains to the desire for people to get 
rewards equal to their efforts – along with an indignation towards behavior such 
as cheating or free-riding (Haidt, 2012; Haidt et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). 
The fairness/reciprocity foundation also includes more sophisticated or abstract 
concepts of justice, including social justice and human rights (Haidt & Graham, 
2007).  
The individualizing foundations emphasize values and moral priorities 
similar to those described by Kohlberg (1963) and Turiel (1983). That is to say, 
the harm and fairness foundations frame morality primarily in terms of harming or 
helping individuals, and treating them fairly. Groups, communities, and 
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institutions are seen as moral units only to the extent of the individuals they are 
comprised of (Haidt, 2012). To that end, if one’s moral values are defined 
primarily by the harm/care and fairness/reciprocity foundations, then violations of 
the socially-binding moral foundations that do not harm or negatively affect other 
people are not seen as morally relevant (Haidt, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993). 
Socially binding foundations: Loyalty, authority, and purity. In Moral 
Foundations Theory, the ethic of community was split into two foundations: in-
group/loyalty and authority/respect (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2009). 
The in-group/loyalty foundation pertains to being a good member of the group, 
such as the family, the community, institutions, society, or country (Haidt et al., 
2009). Its virtues include concepts such as loyalty, putting the group before 
oneself, patriotism, and vigilance or sensitivity towards signs of group subversion, 
betrayal, or disloyalty (Haidt et al., 2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Violations of 
this foundation include disloyalty, undermining group solidarity, and betrayal 
(Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2009).  
Authority/respect is the second moral foundation derived from the ethic of 
community (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2009). The authority/respect 
foundation pertains to respecting and upholding the social order, e.g. tradition, 
and fulfilling the obligations of hierarchical social roles and relationships (Haidt 
et al., 2009). Its virtues include concepts such as obedience, respect, and fulfilling 
the obligational duties of one’s social roles (Haidt et al., 2009). It also relates to 
the virtues of authority figures, such as good leadership and protecting 
subordinates (Haidt et al., 2009). Violations of this foundation include concepts 
13 
 
such as insubordination, disrespect, and the flouting or challenging of tradition, 
the law, or legitimate authorities (Haidt et al., 2009). 
Finally, the ethic of divinity was renamed the purity foundation and, 
conceptually, they are very similar (Graham et al., 2009; Haidt, 2012). Like the 
ethic of divinity, the purity foundation primarily concerns avoiding bodily and 
spiritual contamination (Haidt et al., 2009).  So-called spiritual contaminants to 
avoid may include taboo desires, thoughts, influences, ideas, media, ideologies, or 
beliefs (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2009). Virtues related to 
the purity foundation may include concepts such as wholesomeness, decency, 
abstinence or chastity, and self-control over base or carnal desires (Haidt et al., 
2009; Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Violations of the purity foundation typically 
involve a person behaving in an undignified, uncontrolled, or “animalistic” 
fashion that is unbefitting of humanity’s status as a spiritual or higher being 
(Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 2009).  
Morality and Emotion  
Emotion and morality are strongly linked. In many cases, it is often an 
individual’s immediate affective response to an event that is the best predictor of 
moral judgment – far and above any stated explanation or rationale a person 
might subsequently give for that judgment (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 
1993). That is to say, in many cases, when moral judgments are made towards an 
event, an affective intuition, or quick emotional assessment, comes first (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 1993). In such cases, only then does an individual 
begin to search for reasons or explanations to support this quick emotional insight 
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(Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt et al., 1993). And indeed, if an emotional response 
towards an event is particularly strong, many people will stick quite tenaciously to 
their initial moral judgments, even if all of their stated rationales for their 
judgment have been completely debunked (Haidt et al., 1993). In short, emotions 
are a powerful driver of moral judgment, and in many cases they are the primary 
influence (Haidt, 2012; Haidt et al., 1993).  
Different Types of Moral Emotions. The link between morality and 
emotion is not limited to a general relationship. Specific emotions may relate to 
specific types of moral judgments and values (Haidt, 2003; Weiner, 2006). Haidt 
characterized these moral emotions as being unique in two ways (2003). First, 
their elicitors can often be impersonal, in that the emotion can often be triggered 
by the behavior of impersonal or unfamiliar others (Haidt, 2003). Next, their 
action tendencies tend to be highly social in nature, in that moral emotions prompt 
individuals to help or harm other people – or society at large (Haidt, 2003). 
Weiner identified moral emotions as especially relating to thoughts about 
“controllability, volition, and responsibility” (2006, p. 87). 
Both Haidt and Weiner have identified a specific number of moral 
emotions (Haidt, 2003; Weiner, 2006). Both also classified these moral emotions 
into distinct types of categories. Weiner proposed that moral emotions could be 
classified into categories based on combinations of their “locus” and their 
“antecedent” (2006, p. 95). The locus, or target of the emotion, can be either the 
self or another person (Weiner, 2006). The antecedent, or the emotion’s trigger or 
elicitor, pertains to judgments about the “controllability” or “uncontrollability” of 
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the target’s behavior or abilities (Weiner, 2006, p. 95). As such, Weiner classified 
moral emotions largely in terms of their underlying cognitions, rather than their 
particular valence (2006). In contrast, Haidt proposed that moral emotions could 
be grouped into four major categories: self-critical, other-suffering, other-
praising, and other-critical (2003). This categorization is similar to Weiner’s 
(2006), in that it is classified by target (self versus other). However, it differs in 
that Haidt’s additional level of classification centers primarily on action 
tendencies (Haidt, 2003). 
Classifications of the moral emotions. Shame, embarrassment, and guilt 
are considered self-critical emotions, related to assessments of the self, rather than 
others (Haidt, 2003; Lewis, 1993). Sympathy, empathy, and pity are considered 
other-suffering emotions, which are generally trigged by the distress or suffering 
of others (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). Gratitude and elevation are considered 
other-praising emotions, which are powerful positive responses to others’ virtuous 
behavior (Haidt, 2003). However, because self-critical, other-suffering, and other-
praising emotions do not pertain to this thesis, they will not be discussed further. 
The set of moral emotions which are directly relevant to this thesis are those 
known as the other-critical emotions: contempt, anger, and disgust (Haidt, 2003; 
Rozin et al., 1999).  
The other-critical emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust have been 
identified as belonging to a similar category for quite some time. Izard (1977) 
called contempt, anger, and disgust the hostility triad. Izard proposed that they all 
involve disapproving of others, and are often experienced concurrently in daily 
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life. Additionally, these three emotions are somewhat unique in that they are 
frequently experienced towards third parties who have no personal relationship or 
direct interaction with the person experiencing the emotion (Haidt, 2003). For 
example, simply reading about injustice can make one angry, even if the victims 
of the injustice are unknown strangers in another country (Haidt, 2003). Similarly, 
someone can very easily feel contempt or disgust towards politicians, celebrities, 
or subjects of gossip with whom they have never personally interacted (Haidt, 
2003).  
The three other-critical emotions of contempt, anger, and disgust may 
have their evolutionary roots in reciprocal altruism (Haidt, 2003). Working 
together and cooperating with others produces greater returns than the same 
individuals could produce separately, and this greatly increases the survivability 
of groups (Haidt, 2003). However, at the same time, this also creates the need to 
distance oneself from those who do not reciprocate, leading to a desire to avoid or 
punish cheaters, exploiters, liars, and hypocrites who disrupt the group or do not 
pull their own weight (Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). This sensitivity 
to bad group members or potential burdens may explain why these “other-
condemning” negative social emotions can so easily be felt towards third parties; 
in adaptive terms, they may serve as a way to detect and avoid potential group 
members who could be detrimental to survival – such as those who do not play by 
society’s rules or will not pull their own weight (Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & 
Gross, 2011).  
Links between Other-Critical Emotions and Moral Values  
17 
 
It has been found that the other-critical emotions of contempt, anger, and 
disgust tend to be differentially elicited by specific types of moral or social 
violations (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; 
Rozin et al., 1999). One of the most comprehensive examples of the link between 
specific moral violations and specific emotions was a study by Rozin and 
colleagues (1999), which examined the three other-critical emotions within the 
context of Shweder’s three ethics (Shweder et al., 1997). It revealed that 
participants tended to experience contempt, anger, or disgust depending on which 
of Shweder’s three ethics were violated (Rozin et al., 1999). This has been called 
the “CAD” hypothesis. It was found that violations of the ethic of community 
(social rules and hierarchy) tended to elicit contempt, violations of the ethic of 
autonomy (individual rights) tended to elicit anger, and violations of the ethic of 
divinity (purity or sanctity) tended to elicit disgust (Rozin et al., 1999).  
Since moral foundations theory was directly derived from Shweder’s three 
ethics (Shweder et al., 1997), it stands to reason that the pattern shown in the 
CAD study (Rozin et al., 1999) should also hold true for the five moral 
foundations as well (Haidt et al., 2009). That is to say, violations of the harm and 
fairness foundations (ethic of autonomy) should elicit anger, violations of the 
loyalty and authority foundations (ethic of community) should elicit contempt, 
and violations of the purity foundation (ethic of divinity) should elicit disgust 
(Alderman, Dollar, & Kozlowski, 2010; Haidt, 2012; Horberg et al., 2009). Some 
studies have indeed demonstrated this link between other-critical emotions and 
violations of particular moral foundations. Specifically, fairness/reciprocity 
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violations have been shown to elicit anger, and purity violations have been shown 
to elicit disgust (Horberg et al., 2009). However, it should be noted that while 
some studies have referenced the relation between the CAD emotions and the five 
foundations (e.g. Alderman et al., 2010), it does not seem to be the case that any 
published study has specifically tested the relations between all five moral 
foundations and all three CAD emotions at the same time and within the same 
dataset.  
 As evidenced from the CAD study, contempt and disgust are linked to the 
three socially binding foundations. As such, it has been demonstrated that this 
relation between specific emotions and moral values works in a top-down fashion. 
That is to say, when a moral value has been violated (top), it tends to elicit an 
emotion specifically related to that moral value (down) (Rozin et al., 1999). 
However, there is evidence that this relation works in a bottom-up fashion as well. 
Specifically, it may be the case that the increased levels of contempt or disgust in 
an individual (bottom) may predict increased awareness of, and sensitivity to, 
moral violations related to that emotion (up) (Graham et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 
2009).   
Individual Differences in Emotion as a Predictor for Group-Level Moral 
Values  
With the “CAD” hypothesis in mind, the area of trait emotions – or a 
predisposition towards feeling certain emotions more easily, frequently, and 
intensely than the average person – should be an individual difference variable 
which predicts distinct patterns of moral foundation valuation (Haidt et al., 2009; 
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Horberg et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1999; Vagg & Spielberger, 1999). That is to 
say, if someone is predisposed towards feeling a particular emotion more widely, 
frequently, and intensely than the average person, it may be the case that this 
subsequently predicts increased valuation of the moral foundation(s) linked to that 
emotion (Graham et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 2009). The idea that emotional 
predispositions can predict certain attitudes has received some attention by 
researchers. For example, in the prejudice literature, it has been shown that 
interpersonal disgust sensitivity, or feeling “grossed out” towards “used” or public 
objects, items, or furniture predicted prejudice towards out-groups (Hodson & 
Costello, 2007). Disgust sensitivity is also the one emotional predisposition that 
has been linked to moral values in previous research. 
Although contempt, anger, and disgust are all linked to the moral values, only 
disgust sensitivity, more commonly known in the emotion literature as trait 
disgust, has received significant attention as an individual difference variable 
which predicts moral foundation valuation (Haidt et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 
2009; Rozin et al., 1999). Trait disgust is a general sensitivity towards 
experiencing disgust more easily and strongly towards “gross” stimuli, such as 
smells and sights (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Horberg et al., 2009). 
Specifically, it has been found that trait disgust predicts increased valuation of the 
of the purity foundation, increased condemnation of purity vices, and increased 
praise of purity related virtues (Graham et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 2009) 
These findings demonstrate that disgust has a clear link to the purity 
foundation, both from the bottom-up (trait disgust predicts purity values) and the 
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top-down (purity violations elicit disgust) (Haidt et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 2009; 
Rozin et al., 1999). Might it be the case that this pattern holds true for trait 
contempt as well? That is to say, if contempt is elicited by violations of the loyalty 
and authority foundations (top-down), might it also be the case that trait contempt 
predicts increased valuation of the loyalty and authority foundations (bottom-up) 
(Rozin et al., 1999)? This appears to be a gap in the moral emotion literature.  
A Gap in the Literature: Trait Contempt as a Predictor of Loyalty and 
Authority Foundation Valuation  
If trait contempt follows a model similar to disgust sensitivity, it should be 
the case that high levels of trait contempt predict several things. First, just as trait 
disgust predicts increased valuation of the purity foundation (Haidt et al., 2009; 
Horberg et al., 2009), it should be the case that trait contempt predicts increased 
valuation of the in-group/loyalty and authority/respect foundations. This is 
because violations of these two foundations, based on the ethic of community, 
elicit contempt (Rozin et al., 1999).  This proposed link between trait contempt 
and moral values seems to represent a gap in the moral emotion literature. It 
appears that no published study has investigated the relation between trait 
contempt and Shweder’s three ethics, Moral Foundations Theory, or any other 
theory relating to moral values, attitudes, or judgment. Thus, a study which 
investigates the relations between trait contempt and the loyalty and authority 
foundations should prove to be a unique contribution to the moral emotion 
literature.  
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In order to test the potential relation between trait contempt and the loyalty 
and authority foundations, a trait contempt instrument and a solid theoretical 
background of trait contempt as a construct are needed. Unfortunately, there are to 
two problems. First, there appears to be only one trait contempt instrument in the 
literature (Izard et al., 1993), which may be outdated in light of more recent 
literature regarding the nature of contempt (e.g. Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000). Second, there does not appear to 
be a detailed definition or explanation of trait contempt as a construct within the 
emotion or personality literature. Indeed, trait contempt appears to have received 
very little attention from researchers.  
Trait contempt remains ill-defined and under-researched. There have 
only been a handful of references to the construct of trait contempt in the general 
psychology literature. A developmental study associated trait contempt with an 
avoidant attachment style, and relatively lower accuracy in identifying joyful 
facial expressions (Magai, Distel, & Liker, 1995). Crowley (2013) recently 
studied trait contempt expression, or the tendency to openly express verbal scorn 
towards others, and its relation to individual well-being and attachment. However, 
it seems to be the case that Crowley’s study was concerned only with the 
expression of contempt, rather than the basic tendency to experience it more 
frequently and easily compared to others (2013).  The most significant and 
relevant work on contempt as an individual difference was done by Izard (1972). 
Izard (1972) created a differential emotion scale (DES) which included contempt 
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items, and created an updated version of this scale two decades later (Izard et al., 
1993).   
Unfortunately, contempt has had a history of conflicting definitions and 
classifications, and remained ill-defined within the literature for many decades 
(Haidt, 2003). It is only somewhat recently that contempt has begun to receive an 
increased amount of attention in the literature, and this literature has significantly 
expanded the application, scope, and definition of contempt as an emotion (e.g. 
Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000). 
Specifically, this literature has provided an increased understanding of contempt’s 
elicitors, affective experience, associated cognitions, and action tendencies 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Mackie et al., 2000).  
Many of these elements are not reflected in Izard’s instrument (Izard et al., 1993). 
As such, it may be the case that Izard’s instrument is out of date, and may not 
accurately represent the full scope and nature of trait contempt (Izard et al., 1993).   
Defining and measuring trait contempt: a gap in the literature. In light 
of the sparse coverage of trait contempt in the literature, several concepts must be 
looked at in depth before attempting to examine the link between trait contempt 
and moral values. Trait contempt as a construct needs to be thoroughly defined, 
and this definition must incorporate more recent findings on the nature of 
contempt (e.g. Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Mackie et 
al., 2000). Additionally, a new trait contempt instrument which reflects these 
recent findings needs to be developed. However, in order to more thoroughly 
define trait contempt as a construct, and subsequently develop a new trait 
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contempt instrument, several areas of the emotion and personality literature must 
first be reviewed. First, several fundamental characteristics of emotion must be 
reviewed, so that they can be used at a later point to define and describe contempt 
in functional terms.  
The Functional Features of Emotion  
Emotion can be described through the adaptive, relational, and social 
functions they serve (Ekman, 1992, 1999; Izard, 1977; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; 
Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Tooby and 
Cosmides (1990) described emotions in evolutionary terms, in that they function 
as a way to quickly interpret and respond to situations of common adaptive 
relevance. Frijda and colleagues described emotions in terms of their functions, 
particularly in regards to their involving “states of action readiness, elicited by 
events appraised as emotionally relevant,” with different states being brought 
about by different appraisals regarding harm or help towards an individual’s 
“major goals, motives, and sensitivies” (Fridja, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989, p. 
213). Additionally, Frijda proposed that these states tend to trigger specific 
adaptive and “prewired” behavioral tendencies, physiological responses, and 
“learned behaviors” (Frijda et al., 1989, p. 213).  Ekman describes the primary 
function of emotion as an adaptive way to “deal with inter-organismic 
encounters,”  or “deal quickly with interpersonal encounters, prepared to do so by 
what types of activities have been adaptive in the past ,” both in “the past history 
of our species… and what has been adaptive in our own individual life history” 
(1990, p. 46). 
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 In all of these cases, emotion’s functional characteristics are essentially 
described as fast and mostly involuntary responses to the social environment 
(Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Keltner, 1999).  These responses are mechanisms which 
assist individuals in quickly assessing, navigating, and responding to this social 
environment in adaptive ways (Ekman, 1990; Frijda et al., 1989; Haidt, 2003; 
Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). Thus, in many respects, 
emotions may serve the function of “regulating social behavior” of both the self 
and others (Weiner, 2006, p. 86). Thus, in the case of moral emotions, such as 
contempt, anger, or disgust, it would follow that each emotion serves a unique 
social function, both for the person experiencing the emotion and for those at 
whom the emotion is directed (Haidt & Keltner, 1999). 
The studies in this thesis will be operating under several widely held 
(albeit debated) assumptions about the nature of emotion. First, it is assumed that 
there are a number of emotions which are universal, discrete, and distinct from 
each other – known as basic emotions (Ekman, 1992; Ekman, 1994a; Izard, 
1977). Second, it is assumed that these discrete, basic emotions are triggered by 
different types of cognitive appraisals, or elicitors (Ellsworth & Smith, 1988; 
Lazarus, 1991a; Roseman, Spindel, & Jose, 1990; C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 
1985). Third, it is assumed that experiencing these discrete, basic emotions tends 
to promote specific behavioral tendencies, or action tendencies (Frijda, Kuipers, 
& ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Fourth, it is assumed that 
each of the basic emotions has a unique and universally identifiable facial 
expression associated with it (Ekman, 1992; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). Fifth, it is 
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assumed that different basic emotions tend to cue specific types of cognition: 
examples of such associated cognitions include thoughts, memories, schemas, or 
intuitions (Izard et al., 1993). Finally, it is assumed that contempt, anger, and 
disgust fit these criteria, and are all discrete basic emotions with unique elicitors, 
action tendencies, associated cognitions, and facial expressions (Ekman & Heider, 
1988; Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Izard, 1977; Izard et al., 1993; 
Rozin et al., 1999).  
There are opposing views on whether these three hostile emotions – 
contempt, anger, and disgust – are indeed discrete or basic emotions with unique 
expressions, elicitors, and action tendencies. Some researchers have conflated 
contempt and disgust (Beaumont & Wagner, 2004; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 
2002; Russell, 1991b). Similarly, others have challenged the contempt facial 
expression as being unique (Russell, 1991b; Wagner, 2000). Additionally, some 
have described models of emotion other than a basic/discrete emotion model (e.g. 
Barrett, 2006; Lutz & White, 1986; Wierzbicka, 1992). Unfortunately, it is 
outside the scope of this thesis to discuss these opposing views in depth. 
However, to account for these alternate views on emotion, methodological steps 
will be taken to demonstrate that contempt is indeed distinct from anger and 
disgust.   
The essential features for the study of moral emotions. Researchers 
analyze many different features of emotion, such as elicitors, facial expression, 
physiology, subjective experience, associated cognition, and action tendencies 
(e.g. Frijda, 1986; Haidt, 2003; Izard et al., 1992, 1993; Russell, 1991a). Of these, 
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elicitors, action tendencies, and associated cognitions are the three features of 
emotion which are most relevant to analyzing and explaining morality (Haidt, 
2003). Elicitors and action tendencies are highly relevant to morality because 
these are the most externally oriented aspects of emotion; they are most closely 
related to an individual’s reaction and response to the behavior of other 
individuals (Haidt, 2003). Methodologically, elicitors and action tendencies are 
perhaps the most measurable aspects of moral emotions, at least given the limits 
of survey studies (Haidt, 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). The associated cognitions of 
an emotion are also highly relevant to morality, as these are likely the building 
blocks of more deliberate and conscious judgments, values, and attitudes (Haidt & 
Joseph, 2004; Izard et al., 1993). In regard to elicitors, moral emotions are 
somewhat unique in that they are easily elicited, even when the eliciting event has 
no self-relevance (Haidt, 2003). Moral emotions tend to have some of the most 
pro-social action tendencies, in that they put an individual into a motivational 
state with an increased desire to engage in actions (often untaken), which either 
benefit others, or which maintain, uphold, or benefit society or the social order 
(Frijda, 1986; Haidt, 2003).   
Contempt  
Before trait contempt can be studied and assessed, a fundamental question 
must be answered: what is contempt? Surprisingly, this is not a simple task. 
Contempt has proven to be difficult to define in concrete and easily accessible 
terms (Haidt, 2003). The American Heritage Dictionary defines the emotion of 
contempt as “the feeling with which a person regards anything considered mean, 
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vile, or worthless; disdain; scorn” (2013).  Unfortunately, this type of definition is 
vague and abstract. Additionally, contempt and its synonyms, such as disdain and 
scorn, are not frequently used in everyday speech. This vagueness has hindered 
previous academic definitions as well: contempt has sometimes been defined in 
terms of what it is not. For example, Izard (1977) described contempt as a hostile 
but “cool” emotion, much more subtle than the intensity of anger or the revulsion 
of disgust.  And indeed, contempt’s somewhat obtuse and abstract definitions 
reflect a problematic and confused history for this emotion, both for researchers 
and laypersons. 
Conflicting classifications of contempt by past researchers. Within the 
emotion literature, it is difficult to find a clear, concise, and accessible definition 
of contempt. And indeed, even today, definitions of contempt are still somewhat 
nebulous in nature (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). In part, this is largely because 
contempt has received very little attention from researchers, relative to anger or 
disgust (Haidt, 2003). More importantly, the history of the contempt literature has 
featured significant disagreement and conflicting findings between researchers 
(Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Some researchers had described 
contempt as a blend between anger and disgust (Plutchik, 1980), or as a member 
of the anger family (Lazarus, 1991b). Ekman and Friesen had originally defined 
contempt as a type of disgust (1975). 
However, more recent research has done much to differentiate contempt as 
a distinct emotion. For instance, Ekman and colleagues eventually changed their 
minds, and upgraded contempt to a “basic” emotion, largely because the contempt 
28 
 
facial expression, a unilateral curl and tightening of the lip, is reliably recognized 
across a multitude of cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988). 
Similarly, although there is still some dispute about the nature of contempt (e.g. 
Nabi, 2002; Russell, 1991b), findings have begun to converge within more recent 
research, indicating there are several key characteristics of contempt (e.g. Fischer 
& Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999). One of the 
main reasons recent contempt research has begun to converge is due to increasing 
recognition that contempt is best measured through indirect, rather than direct 
means (Haidt et al., 2003). Specifically, this is because participants and 
laypersons in general often do not know what contempt is (Haidt, 2003).  
A significant confound: semantic confusion over contempt in 
participants. Past research has shown a history of difficulty in assessing 
contempt, as well as a history of inconsistent findings (Fisher & Roseman, 2007; 
Haidt, 2003). Specifically, attempts to directly assess contempt, such as asking 
participants to label, rate, or report on items or stimuli using the word “contempt,” 
have often led to inconsistent or null findings (Fisher & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, 
2003). Oddly, this problem appears to be due to a quirk of the English language 
(Haidt, 2003). English-speaking participants in particular seem to have difficulty 
accurately identifying or describing contempt when dependent measures use the 
word “contempt” itself (Ekman, O’Sullivan, & Matsumoto, 1991; Haidt, 2003; 
Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto, 1992; Rozin et al., 1999). In contrast, non-
English speaking participants semantically differentiate and identify contempt 
from other emotions with substantially higher accuracy (Ekman et al., 1991; 
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Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Keltner, 1999; Matsumoto, 1992; Rozin et al., 1999).  Thus, 
it would seem that contempt is sometimes not semantically distinguished from 
anger or disgust in everyday English (Fisher & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, 2003). 
Fortunately, studies with English-speaking participants have successfully 
distinguished contempt from other emotions when contempt was assessed through 
more indirect methodologies (Haidt, 2003). Some of these studies had participants 
generate their own contempt elicitors (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Haidt & 
Keltner, 1999). Several other studies had dependent variables which described 
contempt’s associated cognitions, such as judgments of inferiority, rather than the 
word “contempt” itself (Izard et al., 1993; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Other 
studies had participants match a picture of the contempt expression to a story or 
scenario (Rosenburg & Ekman, 1995; Rozin et al., 1999). With these findings in 
mind, it is clear that any items developed for a new trait contempt instrument 
should use indirect assessments, rather than directly measuring self-reported 
“contempt” or any of its synonyms.   
Assessing contempt via its unique facial expression. The contempt 
expression will be used as a potential indirect assessment of trait contempt in one 
of the studies outlined in this thesis. As such, the specifics of the contempt 
expression must be reviewed. Contempt has a unique facial expression, which is 
recognized across cultures (Ekman & Friesen, 1986). In simple terms, the 
contempt expression can best be described as a unilateral smirk (Ekman & 
Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988; Rozin et al., 1999). More specifically, the 
contempt expression is characterized by Ekman’s action unit 14 - a unilateral raise 
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and tightening of the lip (Ekman & Heider, 1988).  For several examples of the 
contempt expression, see Figure 1.  
It should be noted, however, that there are some researchers who have 
challenged the uniqueness of the contempt expression. In some studies, the 
contempt expression has been confused with the anger, disgust, or “neutral” 
expressions by participants around 30 to 40 percent of the time (Russell, 1991b; 
Shioiri, Someya, Helmeste, & Tang, 1999; Wagner, 2000). Some of this 
confusion may be due, in part, to the contempt expression being relatively subtle 
compared to the anger and disgust expressions. The muscle movements are on 
only one side of the mouth (which can be confused with smiling), and lack 
activity around other areas of the face such as the nose (such as with disgust) or 
eyebrows (such as with anger) (Ekman & Friesen, 1978). However, a more 
significant problem is that researchers have used differing criteria for what 
constitutes the contempt expression, such as using different Ekman action units 
(Ekman et al., 1991; Rozin et al., 1999). Additionally, it should be noted that, in 
general, participants are seldom perfectly consistent in labeling any facial 
expression with the appropriate emotion name: it is relatively rare to find studies 
which have participant agreement of over 80% for any given facial expression 
that is not extreme or exaggerated (Ekman et al., 1991; Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011; Rozin et al., 1999).  
Importantly, most of the studies with these contentious findings asked 
participants to use the word “contempt” to label expressions, which of course falls 
prey to the major semantic confounds related to the word (Haidt, 2003; 
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Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Given that the contempt expression has been shown 
to be reliably recognized across multiple cultures, and most contentious studies 
used English-speaking participants, it seems particularly likely that the semantic 
confounds of contempt may be the main source of conflicting findings on the 
universality of the contempt expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & 
Heider, 1988; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; 
Russell, 1991b).With this in mind, images of the contempt expression should 
indeed prove to be an effective tool for assessing contempt (Haidt, 2003; 
Rosenburg & Ekman, 1995; Rozin et al., 1999).  
In acknowledgement that there has been some contention about the 
universality of the contempt expression, several steps should be taken when using 
a face matching task as a methodology. Because some researchers have used 
different action units for the contempt expression in the past, it is particularly 
important to select an appropriate photoset for facial expression stimuli (Ekman & 
Heider, 1988; Ekman et al., 1991; Rozin et al., 1999). As such, choosing a pre-
existing, well validated, and standardized photoset, such as Matsumoto and 
Ekman’s Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion (1988) should be 
the most ideal. Specifically, using a standardized and validated photoset should be 
preferable to creating an original photoset, or using stimuli from studies which 
created their own photosets. Additionally, because even successful studies show 
double digit error rates in correctly labeling emotion expressions (Rozin et al., 
1999), it may be best to use facial expression photos which do not feature subtle 
32 
 
expressions.  Rather, facial expression rating tasks might be most effective when 
the photos of facial expressions feature more pronounced and severe expressions.  
Defining contempt via its fundamental characteristics. Keeping in 
mind the semantic difficulties surrounding contempt, one particularly effective 
strategy in defining, describing, and operationalizing contempt may be to break it 
down into several key characteristics. Specifically, this thesis proposes that 
because contempt is not very accessible semantically, it may best be described in 
terms of its characteristics: its elicitors, associated cognitions, action tendencies, 
and affective experience. Based on the findings of the recent contempt literature, I 
propose that the process of feeling contempt appears to have five key 
characteristics.  
Contempt’s five key characteristics. By synthesizing the recent contempt 
literature, and by incorporating the functionalist theory of emotion as a framework 
(Haidt & Keltner, 1999), five key features have begun to emerge across different 
types of studies. First, contempt is elicited via the perception that an individual 
has violated some sort social standard, expectation, or ideal. It may also be 
elicited by the judgment that someone has not “measured up” to some social 
standard, expectation, or ideal (Bell, 2005; Haidt, 2003; Mason, 2003). Second, a 
fundamental associated cognition of contempt is a sense of superiority, 
disapproval, or otherwise “looking down” on the target of contempt, at least along 
the dimension of the social standard being violated (Bell, 2005; Ekman, 1994b; 
Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Izard, 1977; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 
2000; Mason, 2003). Third, another essential cognition associated with contempt 
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is that it involves negative dispositional attributions, or negative judgments about 
the inferiority of a person’s fundamental internal characteristics – not merely their 
specific behaviors (Bell, 2005; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011; Mason, 2003). Fourth, contempt has socially aversive and derogatory 
action tendencies, characterized by a desire or tendency to reject, exclude, or 
ostracize, derogate, and psychologically and emotionally withdraw from the target 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000; Mason, 2003; Roseman, 
Copeland, & Fischer, 2003; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Finally, the 
subjective experience of contempt is best characterized as cold feelings of dislike 
coupled with psychological distancing (Bell, 2005; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Haidt, 2003).  In general terms, this refers to a relatively low-intensity feeling of 
dislike, combined with a loss or lack of warmth, respect, empathy, and/or 
intimacy towards the target of contempt (Bell, 2005; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Haidt, 2003). And indeed, cold feelings of dislike combined with a loss of 
warmth, empathy, and respect may provide an ideal, practical and accessible 
definition of contempt for everyday speech. With these five key characteristics in 
mind, contempt can be described in a more comprehensive fashion.  
Violations of social standards, expectations, or ideals. The first key 
characteristic of contempt concerns the way that it tends to be elicited. In broad 
terms, contempt is elicited via the perception that some sort of social standard, 
expectation, or ideal has been violated, or by judgments of someone not 
“measuring up” to such social standards (Bell, 2005; Haidt, 2003; Mason, 2003). 
In other words, contempt tends to be elicited when someone’s behavior violates 
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one’s minimum expectations of what that person’s behavior should be like. These 
standards can be universal and applicable to all people, such as expectations of 
honesty, responsibility, or intelligence; however, more often these standards relate 
to the target’s specific social role, social status, or social context (Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007, Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Miller, 1997). For instance, contempt 
has been found to be especially linked with perceptions of incompetence: an 
inability to meet even basic expectations or standards within a given role or 
context (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Similarly, contempt has been linked with 
violations of social expectations such as rules and norms – particularly those 
which negatively affect the cohesion of relationships, groups, or communities 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Rozin et al., 1999).  
Contempt is easily felt towards strangers or impersonal third parties with 
whom one does not have a relationship. Contempt can be elicited from even a 
single event or behavior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). 
More personal or direct relationships are somewhat resistant to contempt, but 
when it does occur, contempt tends to be elicited when someone’s behavior 
routinely does not live up to one’s minimum expectations of what a person in that 
role (such as spouse, friend, employee, employer, etc.) should be like (Bell, 2005; 
Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Gottman, Woodin, & Levenson, 2001). The reason 
contempt is more easily felt towards third parties than personal relationships is 
that contempt tends to be elicited when one has the perception of no control over 
the target’s behavior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). This also explains why 
contempt is most likely to develop towards personal relations who routinely fail to 
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live up to expectations – because this signifies a lack of control over the person’s 
behavior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).   
A sense of superiority. Another key feature of contempt is that it involves a 
sense of superiority, disapproval, an inferiority judgment, or “looking down” on 
the target of contempt, at least along the dimension of the social standard being 
violated (Bell, 2005; Ekman, 1994b; Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; 
Izard, 1977; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Mason, 2003). That is to say, when 
contempt is elicited from a social standard being violated, a fundamental 
condition is that the person feeling contempt perceives that they personally live up 
to that standard (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). The traditional connotation of this 
sense of superiority is that it is downward in nature, or felt towards those deemed 
lower in worth, status, or hierarchy (Miller, 1997). However, contempt can also 
be felt upward, towards those of higher status or power who are seen as unworthy 
of their position (Miller, 1997).  
Negative dispositional attributions. Another one of contempt’s key associated 
cognitions is negative dispositional attributions, or negative judgments about the 
inferiority of a person’s stable internal characteristics, and not merely their 
specific behaviors (Bell, 2005; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 
2011; Mason, 2003; Weiner, 2006). Contempt is person-centric, rather than 
behavior-centric (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Weiner, 2006). As such, the negative 
dispositional attributions of contempt tend to promote permanent attitude changes 
towards the target, and these attributions are particularly related to the perception 
that the target is unable or unwilling to change (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). In 
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keeping with both negative dispositional attribution and a sense of superiority, 
judgments associated with incompetence, such as attributing behaviors to 
stupidity, carelessness, ignorance, or irresponsibility are particularly likely to be 
associated with contempt (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Weiner, 2006).  
 Aversive and derogatory action tendencies. Contempt has several types of 
action tendencies. Specifically, contempt has an aversive or avoidant action 
tendency, i.e., it prompts a desire to reject, socially exclude, ostracize, shun, or 
ignore the target (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000; Mason, 2003; 
Roseman, Copeland, & Fischer, 2003; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). This 
action tendency applies to contempt towards both individuals and groups (such as 
out-groups) (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Mackie et al., 2000). While there are 
other emotions with aversive action tendencies, such as disgust or fear, contempt 
seems to be unique in that it is heavily characterized by a tendency to socially, 
psychologically, and emotionally withdraw from the target, rather than simple 
physical withdrawal (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, 2003). Contempt has also 
been linked with a desire to derogate, belittle, or disparage the target (Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007). However, in keeping with its avoidant action tendencies, 
contempt is negatively correlated with direct verbal attack; rather, any such 
derogation is typically done behind the back of the target (Fischer & Roseman, 
2007). With this is mind, it seems especially likely that contempt may be one of 
the primary emotions involved in gossip (Haidt, 2003).  
Cold feelings of dislike with psychological distancing. In terms of contempt 
as an experience, it may best be characterized by cold feelings of dislike with 
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psychological distancing, or a loss or lack of warmth, respect, empathy, and/or 
intimacy towards the target (Bell, 2005; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, 2003, 
Miller, 1997). When felt towards third parties or impersonal relations, contempt 
typically involves an indifference towards the target’s wellbeing, feelings, or 
circumstances. In other words, contempt elicits psychological distancing 
combined with a disregard for any situational attributions for the disliked 
behaviors (Miller, 1997). Towards more personal or intimate relations, contempt 
tends to cause the person feeling contempt to view the relationship as less 
intimate, and repeated feelings of contempt typically lead to the deterioration of 
the relationship (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Gottman, Woodin, & Levenson,  
2001). Additionally, the cold feelings and psychological distancing of contempt 
tends to be chronic, and it often involves permanent negative changes in 
perceptions or beliefs about a person (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1994). Similarly, contempt’s cold feelings and psychological distancing 
are difficult to change. The person feeling contempt often has little or no desire to 
reconcile with the target, and when targets attempt to reconcile or apologize, it 
often does not help alleviate the feelings of contempt (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Mason, 2003). 
What is a Trait Emotion?  
Before defining and describing trait contempt, the concept of trait emotions 
must first be defined. In broad terms, trait emotions are individual differences in 
the tendency to experience a specific emotion more easily and intensely than 
average – along with that emotion’s associated cognitive and behavioral 
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tendencies (Izard et al., 1993). Subsequently, these differences in emotionality 
manifest into the development of distinct patterns of emotion, cognition, and 
behavior, characterized by elements of the emotion in question (Izard et al., 
1993). There are several key features in the development and makeup of a trait 
emotion. First, every individual has differing activation thresholds for each basic 
emotion (Izard et al., 1993). Trait emotions are characterized by a low activation 
threshold for the emotion in question (Izard et al., 1993). An individual with a low 
activation threshold for a specific emotion will experience that emotion much 
more easily, frequently, and intensely than those with higher thresholds (Izard et 
al., 1993). Additionally, individuals who experience an emotion more easily, 
frequently, and intensely are also subject to selective perception, or an increased 
awareness of stimuli related to the specific emotion (Izard et al., 1993). Increased 
frequency of occurrence and selective perceptions related to an emotion will also 
lead to experiencing cognitions associated with the emotion more frequently 
(Izard et al., 1993). When an individual frequently experiences an emotion along 
with its selective perceptions and its associated cognitions, this subsequently leads 
to an increased tendency towards behaviors and actions related to that emotion 
(Izard et al., 1993).  
This combination of increased activation, perception, cognition, and behavioral 
tendencies leads to the development of distinct patterns called “emotion-
cognition-action bonds,” which, in aggregate, can be referred to as personality 
traits (Izard et al., 1993, p. 843). In sum, these personality traits are called trait 
emotions (Izard et al., 1993; Kassinov et al., 2002; Spielberger, 1996). Put more 
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simply,  because each basic emotion uniquely affects one’s cognition, 
perceptions, and actions, those who rate highly on a specific trait emotion will 
show specific patterns of cognition, perception, and action based around the 
emotion in question (Izard et al., 1993). 
Defining Trait Contempt. Very little has been written or researched in 
depth about the makeup of trait contempt. Izard et al. (1993) operationalized trait 
contempt primarily in terms of frequently feeling superior and making negative 
attributions to others in one’s day to day life. Crowley (2013) described trait 
contempt expression, or the tendency to frequently express contempt towards 
others, as primarily characterized by interpersonal coldness and a tendency to 
express verbal dislike or disapproval towards others. Beyond this, it appears that 
trait contempt has not been described in considerable detail. However, given that 
contempt’s elicitors, associated cognitions, and action tendencies have become 
clearer, and given the defining characteristics of trait emotions, it should now be 
possible to construct a more comprehensive description of trait contempt which 
incorporates more recent findings from the contempt literature.  
With this in mind, a newer model of trait contempt will be proposed that 
synthesizes the key characteristics of contempt, major elements of the 
functionalist model of emotion, and the general model of trait emotions. In 
accordance with the general model of trait emotions, this means that trait 
contempt should be characterized by a lower activation threshold of contempt, or 
a tendency to experience cold feelings with psychological distance towards others 
more easily, frequently, and intensely than normal (Haidt, 2003; Izard et al., 1993; 
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Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Trait contempt should also be characterized by an 
increased prevalence of contempt-related selective perceptions, specifically 
increased awareness of social standard violations (Bell, 2005; Haidt, 2003; Izard 
et al., 1993). Additionally, trait contempt should be characterized by more 
frequent contempt-related cognitions; specifically, a general sense of superiority 
and frequent negative dispositional attributions (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; 
Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Izard et al., 1993). And finally, trait 
contempt should be characterized by more frequent contempt-related action 
tendencies; in particular, an increased tendency to reject, avoid, and derogate 
social standard violators (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Izard et al., 1993; Mackie et 
al., 2000).   
Rationale 
 Several research and analytical strategies can be used in order to assess the 
relation between trait contempt and the loyalty and authority foundations. Due to 
gaps in the literature related to moral emotions, trait emotions, and contempt, 
several phenomena must be investigated in addition to the main research question 
in order to thoroughly analyze the link between trait contempt and moral values. 
First, the proposed five key features of contempt must be validated as constructs, 
and a new trait contempt instrument based on these features must be developed 
and tested. Second, because two indirect assessment methodologies show promise 
(facial expression matching and assessing contempt’s key components), both 
should be employed to assess trait contempt and its relation to loyalty and 
authority values (Izard et al., 1993; Rozin et al., 1999). Finally, the assumed links 
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between the CAD model and the five moral foundations must be empirically 
tested (Alderman et al., 2010; Haidt et al., 2009; Rozin et al., 1999). With this 
large number of additional concepts to investigate, the use of two studies seems to 
be the most appropriate approach to thoroughly investigate the main research 
questions.  
 Testing the internal consistency and cohesiveness of the five key 
characteristics of contempt. Although the contempt literature has begun to 
converge in regards to its common characteristics, it appears that no published 
study has explicitly investigated the cohesion between the five elements of 
contempt within the same dataset. Thus, as the new trait contempt instrument is 
based on these five key elements, it appears necessary to test the proposed 
cohesion of these key elements, in addition to the development of the trait 
contempt instrument. As such, it seems appropriate to accomplish this across two 
studies. Specifically, it would be ideal to develop a very broad instrument for 
Study 1 in order to test for cohesion, consistency, and construct validity, and then 
create and utilize the more refined and effective trait contempt instrument 
(following analyses of study 1) for Study 2.  
Two indirect methodologies for assessing contempt and trait 
contempt. As previously mentioned, there are significant methodological issues 
surrounding the measure of contempt. This is because participants often do not 
understand the meaning of the word “contempt” and may not find the emotion 
very accessible (Haidt, 2003; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Rozin et al., 1999). 
There are two potential solutions to this methodological issue. First, contempt, 
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and subsequently trait contempt, might be accurately measured indirectly by 
means of assessing contempt’s elicitors, associated cognitions, action tendencies, 
and affective experiences (Izard et al., 1993).  Second, methodologies that assess 
contempt by means of matching photos of facial expressions to a story were also 
particularly successful in distinguishing contempt from other emotions 
(Rosenburg & Ekman, 1995; Rozin et al., 1999). Thus, it seems prudent to use the 
former methodological strategy in Study 1, and the latter methodological strategy 
in Study 2.  
Empirically testing the CAD model’s application to the five moral 
foundations. Although it has been assumed that the CAD model applies to the 
five moral foundations, this has not been explicitly empirically tested in any 
published study (Alderman, 2010; M. Brubacher, personal communication, July, 
2013). Although previous studies have found that purity violations elicit disgust, 
it appears that no study has empirically tested whether harm and fairness 
violations elicit anger, and whether loyalty and authority violations elicit 
contempt (Graham et al., 2009; Horberg et al., 2009). These proposed relations 
are essential to the main research question of this thesis. Therefore, it is necessary 
to empirically test these relations.  
Study 1  
 Study 1 was designed to accomplish several goals. The foremost goal was 
to develop, refine, and utilize a contemporary trait contempt instrument, and to 
test the cohesiveness and internal consistency of the proposed five key 
characteristics of contempt that make up that instrument. In order to demonstrate 
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discriminant validity of the trait contempt instrument, measures of trait anger and 
trait disgust were included in the study. In order to demonstrate convergent 
validity, two alternative trait contempt instruments were included in the study. 
The Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al. 2011) was included in order 
to test the relation between trait contempt and the loyalty and authority 
foundations. Finally, items assessing political ideology and reciprocity valuation 
(in isolation from fairness valuation) were also included in the study for the 
purposes of future publications. However, these measures were not included 
within this study’s analyses.  
Hypotheses  
Hypothesis I. Through the use of an exploratory factor analysis, it is 
predicted that items from each of the trait contempt subscales will load onto 
separate factors with high internal consistency. This would demonstrate construct 
validity for each of the subscales.  
Hypothesis II. It is predicted that all factors which emerge from the 
testing of Hypothesis I will contribute to an overall latent variable called trait 
contempt. This would demonstrate construct validity for the latent trait contempt 
construct.   
Hypothesis IIIa. It is predicted that this study’s trait contempt instrument 
will have discriminant validity from both the trait anger and trait disgust scales.  
Hypothesis IIIb. It is predicted that this study’s trait contempt instrument 
will have convergent validity with the two alternative trait contempt instruments. 
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Hypothesis IV. It is predicted that trait contempt will be a stronger 
predictor of loyalty and authority foundation valuation than both trait anger and 
trait disgust.  
Hypothesis V. It is predicted that this study’s trait contempt instrument 
will be a stronger predictor of loyalty and authority foundation valuation than 
both of the alternative trait contempt instruments.  
Method 
Study 1 used a correlational design. All participants took an online survey 
including instruments that assess trait contempt, trait disgust, trait anger, valuation 
of the five moral foundations (plus reciprocity items), political ideology, and 
demographics.  
Participants  
Participants were recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (N = 614), an 
online service that enables researchers to pay participants a small fee to take 
surveys. They had a mean age of 34.29 (SD = 13.18). Participants were 33.6% 
male, 56.2% female, and 10.2% did not report their gender. In regard to race and 
ethnicity, 72% were Caucasian, 9.9% were African American, 7.7% were Asian, 
and 5.2% were Hispanic or Latino/a.  
Procedure 
Due to the nature of M-Turk, participants self-select which studies or tasks 
they wish to take part in. Participants were offered $0.20 in exchange for their 
time. The link to the study was titled, “Morality and personality survey: how does 
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your psychology inform your values?” and the description text read “take a 20 
minute survey about your emotions, attitudes, and moral values.”  
Upon clicking the study link, participants were brought to an online survey 
designed on Qualtrics. On the first page of the survey, participants were briefed 
and gave informed consent. The briefing described the study as a survey about 
emotions and attitudes that will take approximately 20 minutes of their time, and 
it informed participants of their rights as a research participant.  
Through the course of the survey, participants completed five different 
trait emotion instruments: trait anger, trait disgust, trait empathy, and two for trait 
contempt. These trait emotion instruments consisted of statements describing 
thoughts, feelings, or behaviors, and participants rated how frequently or how 
strongly each item applied to them. Participants also completed the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ), which features questions about moral values, 
half of which consist of general abstract statements, and half of which are 
concrete questions pertaining to specific issues (Graham et al., 2011). All of these 
instruments were completed one at a time.  
In order to provide counterbalancing, participants took these instruments 
in a random order. Half of the participants took the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire first, and half took the four trait emotion instruments first. 
Additionally, the order of the four trait emotion instruments was randomized to 
provide for further counterbalancing. Due to the length of the survey, attention 
check items were also included, in order to screen for participants who were 
inattentive. Finally, participants completed a demographics section, which 
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included items that assess political ideology, socioeconomic status, race/ethnicity, 
gender, education, and age. At the end of the survey, participants viewed a 
debriefing page that explained the purpose of the study.  
Materials 
Trait contempt instrument. For the full content of the trait contempt 
instrument, see Appendix A. The instrument had 56 items total, and was 
comprised of seven subscales, with eight items each. All items were measured on 
7-point scales. Scales assessing frequency were rated from 1 (almost never) to 7 
(almost always). Scales assessing agreement were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree).  
The seven subscales of this instrument related to the five key features of 
contempt that were proposed in the literature review: increased awareness of 
social standard violations, frequent feelings of superiority, increased negative 
dispositional attributions, aversive and derogatory action tendencies, and frequent 
cold feelings with psychological distancing. Aversive and derogatory action 
tendencies were assessed using two separate subscales; cold feelings and 
psychological distancing were also assessed using two separate subscales.  
Increased awareness of social standard violations subscale. The 
increased awareness of social standard violations subscale asked participants how 
often they notice social standard violating behaviors in their day-to-day lives. This 
subscale used frequency measurements. For example, participants rated how 
frequently they notice strangers or acquaintances “being inconsiderate” or “acting 
inappropriately.” 
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Frequent feelings of superiority subscale. The frequent feelings of 
superiority subscale assessed how frequently participants make inferiority 
judgments towards strangers and acquaintances in their day-to-day lives. This 
subscale used frequency measurements. For example, participants rated how often 
they notice others being “stupid,” “incompetent,” or “careless” in their day to day 
lives. Reverse-scored items used the antonyms of these terms.  
Increased negative dispositional attributions subscale. The increased 
negative dispositional attribution subscale asked participants how often they make 
quick negative dispositional judgments about others during their day-to-day lives. 
This subscale used frequency measurements. For example, participants gave 
frequency ratings on items such as: ““I assume someone’s bad behavior reflects 
something about their personality,” “If someone is in a bad situation, I think that 
it’s probably their own fault,” and “I make efforts to give people the benefit of the 
doubt” (reverse scored). 
Aversive and derogatory action tendencies subscales. Trait contempt’s 
aversive and derogatory action tendencies were split into two different subscales. 
The aversive action tendency subscale asked participants how likely they are to 
socially reject or exclude social standard violators (i.e. social aversion). The 
derogatory action tendencies subscale asked how often participants engage in 
derogatory behaviors behind a person’s back. Both subscales used frequency 
measurements. As an example of an aversive action tendency item, participants 
rated how frequently they “give someone the cold shoulder.” As an example of a 
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derogatory action tendency item, participants rated how frequently they “talk 
about other peoples’ bad qualities.” 
Cold feelings with psychological distance subscales. Trait contempt’s 
affective experiences were split into two subscales. Both subscales used an agree-
disagree scale. The frequent cold feelings subscale assessed how frequently 
participants have cold feelings of dislike towards others. For example, an item 
assessing cold feelings states “It doesn’t take much for me to dislike someone.” 
The frequent psychological distancing subscale assessed how often participants 
feel a loss of warmth, respect, and empathy towards others. For example, an item 
assessing psychological distancing states “It is easy for me to lose respect for a 
person.” 
Additional contempt instruments. In addition to the trait contempt 
instrument developed for this study, participants also completed several 
previously-developed items which assess contempt. Specifically, participants took 
the three items from Izard and colleagues’ trait contempt scale (1993), and the 
nine items from Crowley’s trait contempt expression scale (2013).  
Izard’s trait contempt scale.  Izard and colleagues (1993) developed a 
short trait contempt instrument that assesses the tendency to experience contempt 
as a general temperament. In this instrument, participants are given the prompt, 
“in your daily life, how often do you…,” and are asked to provide scaled ratings 
for three items (Izard et al., 1993, p. 851). These items are: “feel like somebody is 
a ‘good for nothing’,” “feel like you are better than somebody,” and “feel like 
somebody is a low-life, not worth the time of day” (Izard et al., 1993, p. 851).  
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Crowley’s trait contempt expression instrument.  In addition to Izard’s 
scale, I also included nine items from a trait contempt expression scale devised by 
Crowley (2013). Crowley’s scale specifically assesses an individual’s tendency to 
openly express contempt towards others. Crowley’s scale features nine items. Six 
items assess the open expression of verbal disdain, such as “When I feel dislike or 
hate for someone, I usually express it” (pg. 22). The other three items assess 
interpersonal coldness, such as “I consider myself to be a very cold person” (p. 
22).   
Trait anger and trait disgust scales. In order to demonstrate discriminant 
validity of the trait contempt instrument, participants also took two short 
instruments assessing trait anger and trait disgust; these instruments have five 
items in total. Both the trait anger and trait disgust scales included in this study 
were directly taken from the updated differential emotion scale (DES), created by 
Izard et al. (1993).  
The DES trait anger scale. The DES trait anger scale assesses anger-
proneness as a general temperament (Izard et al., 1993). The trait anger scale 
features three items. Participants were asked how often they experience the 
following in their daily lives: “feel like screaming at somebody or banging on 
something,” “feel angry, irritated, annoyed,” and “feel mad at somebody” (Izard 
et al., 1993, p. 851). These items were rated using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 
(very rarely) to 7 (very frequently). 
The DES trait disgust scale. The DES trait disgust scale featured two 
items, which assess a tendency towards experiencing non-social disgust easily 
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(Izard et al., 1993). Participants were asked how often they experience the 
following in their daily lives: “feel like something stinks, puts a bad taste in your 
mouth,” and “feel disgusted, like something is sickening” (Izard et al., 1993, p. 
851).  These items were rated using a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (very rarely) 
to 7 (very frequently).  
Moral Foundations Questionnaire. The Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (MFQ) assesses five moral dimensions, or “foundations”: 
harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity 
(Graham et al., 2011). The questionnaire features 32 items in total, and consists of 
two sections with 16 items each. Each section contains 15 items related to the 
moral foundations (three items per foundation), along with one attention check 
item (Graham et al., 2011). In total, this instrument gives six scores for each 
moral foundation. These six scores are used to calculate means for each of the 
five foundations (Graham et al., 2011).  
The first section of the MFQ features abstract or general statements related 
to each of the five moral foundations, and asks people to rate how relevant these 
concepts are in deciding whether something is right or wrong (Graham et al., 
2011). For example, one statement for the fairness foundation reads, “Whether or 
not some people were treated differently than others” (Graham et al., 2011, p. 
385). These items are rated on a 7-point scale, from 1 (not at all relevant) to 7 
(extremely relevant) (Graham et al., 2011). The second section assesses more 
concrete and specific statements. For example, one statement for the harm 
foundation reads, “One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenseless 
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animal” (Graham et al., 2011, pp. 385). The items are rated on a 7-point scale, 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (Graham et al., 2011).  
Reciprocity valuation items. For the purposes of future publications, six 
new items were created and included within the MFQ portion of the survey. These 
items specifically assessed reciprocity valuation, in isolation from fairness 
valuation. The “general statements” section of the MFQ included three new 
reciprocity items, which used the same “whether or not someone…” format as the 
original MFQ (p. 385). These three items were “whether or not someone:” 
cheated, paid their fair share, and gives more than they take (p. 385). The 
“specific statements” section of the MFQ included three new reciprocity items, 
using several MFQ items as templates. These items were: “One of the worst 
things a person could do is” ask others for help but never return the favor, “When 
the government makes laws, the number one principle should be” that people get 
rewards equal to the contribution they make, and “I think it’s morally wrong 
when” a person does little while profiting off of someone else’s hard work (p. 
385)  
Demographics. The demographic section assessed income, race/ethnicity, 
education level, gender, and age. Participants completed several short items 
pertaining to political ideology, which used a 7-point scale from 1 (very liberal) to 
7 (very conservative). One item assessed their general political views, one 
assessed their views on economic issues, and another assessed their views on 
social issues.  
Results and Discussion 
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Data Preparation 
Prior to this study’s analyses, participants were removed from the dataset 
if they failed either of the attention check items, did not complete substantial 
portions of the survey, and/or completed the survey in less than seven minutes; 
the seven minute cutoff was established via time trials, and it was determined that 
going through this study’s 116 items and the instructions could not reasonably be 
completed under this time. Out of an original 614 participants, 11 were cut for 
having incomplete data (i.e. missing the entire moral foundation or trait emotion 
sections), 76 participants were cut for finishing the survey in less than seven 
minutes, and 104 participants were cut for failing one or both of the attention 
check items. This resulted in a total N of 423. All positively framed items from 
the trait contempt questionnaire (e.g. emotional warmth items) were reverse-
scored prior to conducting any analyses. All such items are marked with an (R) in 
Appendix A.   
Exploratory Factor Analysis  
Prior to testing this study’s hypotheses, items from the trait contempt 
instrument were analyzed using a series of exploratory factor analyses. This was 
done in order to increase the construct validity of the instrument by identifying 
items that did not share much common variance with the rest of the instrument’s 
items (Pett et al., 2013). Results from the factor analyses also allowed the trait 
contempt instrument to be reduced to a more feasible number of items that better 
represented trait contempt as a construct (Pett et al., 2013). These exploratory 
factor analyses were done using common factor analysis, otherwise known as 
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principle axis factoring (PAF). PAF allows each of the factors to correlate with 
one another, and it only retains the common variance among the variables; it is 
typically recommended when it is predicted that all of the factors are theoretically 
related (Pett et al., 2013). Because all subscales and items were designed to assess 
an underlying construct – trait contempt – PAF was ideal in this case, as it 
allowed items that had little common variance with the other items to be more 
easily identified and subsequently removed.  
Initial principle axis factoring model. An initial PAF was done to 
identify the most appropriate number of factors to use in subsequent fixed-factor 
solution PAFs. The initial PAF used the direct oblimin rotation and a delta 
parameter of zero. It had a KMO value of .92, and Bartlett’s test was significant at 
p < .000, indicating that the items as a whole were highly interrelated and well-
suited to be used in a factor analysis (Pett et al., 2013). Determining this 
appropriate number of factors was guided by identifying which factors had both 
an eigenvalue of > 1 and accounted for > 5% of the total variance in the model; 
this decision was also guided by examining the scree plot’s point of discontinuity 
(see Figure 2). The initial PAF identified 12 factors which had Eigenvalues > 1, 
but only two of these factors explained more than 5% of the model’s variance; the 
first factor had an eigenvalue of 14.59 and accounted for 26.06% of the model’s 
variance, and the second factor had an eigenvalue of 3.86 and accounted for 6.9% 
of the model’s variance. However, a third factor was close to meeting the criteria; 
it had a large eigenvalue (2.56) and explained 4.58% of the model’s variance. In 
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contrast, the scree plot  indicated that a five-factor solution could be viable, as 
solutions with greater than five factors represented the point of discontinuity.  
Fixed-factor principle axis factoring models. Based on the results of the 
initial PAF, several subsequent PAFs with fixed-factor solutions were done in 
order to identify items which routinely loaded poorly across multiple factor 
solutions; this was also done to identify the general factor structure of the trait 
contempt instrument, in order to guide later decisions related to scale construction 
for a final version of the trait contempt instrument. Each fixed-factor PAF used a 
direct oblimin rotation with a delta parameter of 0. Based on the selection criteria 
used in the initial PAF, these subsequent PAFs used fixed-factor solutions with 
two, three, and five factors. An additional seven-factor solution model was also 
included in these analyses in order to examine whether factors thematically 
related to the original organization of the seven subscales would emerge.  
Hypothesis I: Testing the Construct Validity of the Trait Contempt 
Instrument’s Subscales 
 Hypothesis I predicted that items from each of the trait contempt subscales 
would load onto separate factors that would have high internal consistency. 
Hypothesis I was tested by examining the results of the two, three, five, and seven 
fixed-factor PAF models described in the previous section. Two criteria were used 
to confirm Hypothesis I; (1) the results of the factor analyses should yield factors 
based on the original categorical organization of the subscales, and (2) scales 
based on each of these factors should have an α > .80. This process was also used 
to identify items which could be cut from the scale; if an item had consistently 
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loaded < .40 across most models and it reduced the internal consistency of the 
scale based on that factor, then that item was subsequently cut from the final 
version of the trait contempt instrument which was used to test subsequent 
Hypotheses. Upon examination of each of the fixed-factor solution model results, 
several consistent trends emerged regarding the factor structure of the trait 
contempt instrument.   
 Cold feelings and avoidant action tendencies. Across most models, 
nearly all items from the cold feelings and avoidant action tendency subscales 
routinely hung together onto a single factor; this coldness/avoidance factor had 
eigenvalues > 14 and accounted for > 25% of the trait contempt instrument’s 
variance across all fixed-factor solution models. These findings strongly indicated 
that items from the coldness and avoidance subscales could be combined into a 
single scale. These results met the first criteria of Hypothesis I; items from the 
coldness and avoidant action tendency subscales loaded onto a single factor in a 
consistent manner.   
 Cold feelings and avoidant action tendencies: Internal reliability and 
items dropped. None of the items from the cold feelings and avoidant action 
tendency subscales consistently loaded < .40 across the different PAF models, 
indicating all items from these subscales could be retained. Combined, all eight 
items from the avoidant action tendencies subscale had high internal reliability, (α 
= .84), as did all eight items from the cold feelings subscale, (α = .82). In both 
cases, the alphas did not improve upon the deletion of any individual items. When 
all 16 items from these two subscales were combined into a single scale, the 
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internal reliability remained high, (α = .89), and their reliability was not improved 
upon the deletion of any individual items. These results met the second criteria of 
Hypothesis I; items from the cold feelings and avoidant action tendency subscales 
– as well as their combination – had high internal consistencies, with α > .80. 
 Feelings of superiority and social standard violations.  Across most 
models, items from the feelings of superiority and social standard violation 
awareness subscales routinely hung together onto either one or two factors. In the 
five-factor model, items from these subscales split into two factors; one factor 
contained all positively framed (I.e. reverse-scored) superiority and social 
standard violation items, while a second factor contained all negatively framed 
items from these two subscales. In the three- and two-factor models, nearly all 
items from both subscales loaded onto a single factor. Across all models, factors 
containing negatively framed superiority and social standard items had 
eigenvalues > 3.65 and accounted for > 6.7% of the trait contempt instrument’s 
variance. These results met the first criteria of Hypothesis I; items from the 
feelings of superiority and social standard violation awareness subscales loaded 
onto a single subscale in a consistent manner.  
 Feelings of superiority and social standard violations: Internal 
reliability and items dropped. All eight items from the feelings of superiority 
subscale had high internal reliability, (α = .89), and the alpha did not improve 
upon the deletion of any item; all superiority subscale items were retained. 
Similarly, all eight items from the social standard violations awareness subscale 
had a moderately high alpha, (α = .81). However, two of the reverse-scored items 
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from the social standard violation subscale had low loadings across the various 
PAF models:  “Behaving better than I expect them to” and “Doing their job better 
than I expected them to.”  Deleting these two poor-loading items increased the 
subscale’s alpha, (α = .84), so they were subsequently dropped from the scale. 
The combination of the remaining 14 items from these two subscales had a high 
alpha, (α = .91); the alpha did not improve upon the deletion of any items. These 
results met the second criteria of Hypothesis I; both subscales – as well as their 
combination – had high internal consistencies, with α > .80. 
 Derogatory action tendencies. The loadings of items from the derogatory 
action tendencies subscale were somewhat less consistent across the different 
PAF models. In the two- and three-factor solutions, derogatory action tendency 
items loaded onto a large factor primarily consisting of cold feelings and avoidant 
action tendency items; however, the majority of derogatory action tendency items 
loaded < .40 in the two-factor solution. In the five- and seven-factor solutions, 
most derogatory action tendency items formed their own factor; this factor had a 
minimum eigenvalue of 1.78 and explained a minimum of 3.18% of both model’s 
variance. Thus, these results mostly fit the first criteria of Hypothesis I; items 
from the derogatory action tendency scale formed their own factor, indicating this 
subscale assessed a valid construct. However, these results also indicated that 
derogatory action tendencies may be more weakly relate to the overall trait 
contempt construct than the two previously discussed factors.  
 Derogatory action tendencies: Internal reliability and items dropped. 
The eight items from the derogatory action tendency subscale had a moderately 
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high alpha (α = .82). One item, “I talk about other peoples’ good qualities,” 
consistently loaded < .40 across most PAF models; deleting this item increased 
the scale’s reliability (α = .83), so it was removed from the instrument. These 
results met the second criteria of Hypothesis I; the derogatory action tendency 
subscale had moderately high consistency, with α > .80.  
 Psychological distancing and negative dispositional attributions. Items 
from the psychological distancing and negative dispositional attribution subscales 
did not load in a consistent manner across the different PAF models. In the two- 
and three-factor solutions, about half of the items from these subscales loaded 
weakly (< .45) onto a large factor primarily consisting of the cold feelings and 
avoidant action tendency items. However, most items from these two subscales 
generally did not load > .40 on any theoretically sensible factor; indeed, the 
majority of these items did not load > .40 on any factors across most of the PAF 
models. Given that these items did not consistently load onto a theoretically 
sensible factor, the first criteria for Hypothesis I was not met for the psychological 
distancing and negative dispositional attribution subscales.  
 Psychological distancing and negative dispositional attributions: 
Internal reliability and items dropped. The eight items from the negative 
dispositional attribution subscale did not have a sufficiently high alpha, (α = .75). 
Furthermore, three of its items consistently loaded < .40 across all PAF models: 
“If someone is in a bad situation, I think that it’s probably their own fault,” “I 
assume someone’s bad behavior reflects something about their personality,” and 
“I assume that someone’s good behavior reflects something about their 
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character.” Deleting these three items improved the negative dispositional 
attribution subscale’s alpha to an acceptable level (α = .80); thus, the negative 
dispositional attribution subscale met the second criteria for Hypothesis I.  
 The eight items from the psychological distancing subscale did not have a 
sufficiently high alpha, (α = .78). Three psychological distancing items 
consistently loaded < .40 across most PAF models: “I have little sympathy for 
people who can’t get their act together,” “I expect most people to disappoint me,” 
and “I have low expectations for people.” However, deleting any combination of 
these items lowered the psychological distancing scale’s reliability. Therefore, the 
psychological distancing subscale met neither the first nor the second criteria for 
Hypothesis I. However, given that the psychological distancing scale’s reliability 
was very close to the criteria (α = .80), it was included in subsequent analyses.  
 Summary: Reduced trait contempt instrument. I determined that a 
five-factor/subscale model was the most appropriate way to organize the size-
reduced trait contempt instrument. The PAF and subsequent reliability analyses 
clearly indicated that the cold feelings and avoidant action tendency items should 
be combined into a single scale (16 items); these two tests similarly indicated that 
the feelings of superiority and social standard violation items should be combined 
into a single scale (14 items). The PAF results were not as consistent for the 
remaining three subscales; however, each subscale had a high enough internal 
reliability that they could justifiably be retained in their original forms (minus 
several items). Therefore, the final trait contempt instrument will also consist of 
the following three subscales: negative dispositional attributions (5 items), 
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psychological distancing (8 items), and derogatory action tendencies (7 items). 
The means from each of these five factors was combined into an omnibus trait 
contempt scale. This omnibus scale was used for all subsequent analyses of Study 
1.  
Hypothesis II: Do the Subscales Contribute to a Single Trait Contempt 
Factor?  
Hypothesis II predicted that all factors that emerged from the testing of 
Hypothesis I will contribute to an overall latent variable called trait contempt. 
This prediction was tested using Cronbach’s alpha (1951) and a confirmatory 
factor analysis. Means for each of the five previously described trait contempt 
subscales were tested with a Cronbach’s alpha. For the omnibus trait contempt 
construct, an alpha of .70 or greater was considered acceptable. This is because 
broad and multifaceted constructs, by their nature, tend to have lower alphas than 
simpler constructs (Graham et al., 2011; Santos, 1999). High internal consistency 
on the omnibus scale would also support the proposal that the associated 
cognitions, action tendencies, and feelings assessed in the five subscales do 
indeed comprise the key elements of contempt as general emotion. The first 
criteria of Hypothesis II was confirmed; the internal reliability of the five 
subscales, combined into an omnibus trait contempt scale, did indeed have strong 
reliability, (α = .87); the alpha did not improve upon deleting any of the five 
subscales. Thus, one component of Hypothesis II was confirmed.  
Confirmatory factor analysis. The contribution of each factor/subscale 
to the overall latent trait contempt construct was tested using a confirmatory 
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factor analysis (CFA). The individual means of each of the five factors/subscales 
(derived from the PAF analyses) were used as predictors of a latent trait contempt 
construct. The results of the CFA should indicate which factors are significantly 
contributing to the latent variable, as well as the relative strength of these 
contributions. For use in the CFA, correlations using listwise deletion (n = 503) 
were calculated between the following subscales: cold feelings and avoidant 
action tendencies, feelings of superiority and social standard violation awareness, 
negative dispositional attributions, psychological distancing, and derogatory 
action tendencies; see Table 1 for this correlation table. All observed variables 
used in the CFA had a normal distribution.1  
LISREL version 9 was used to conduct the CFA. The maximum likelihood 
estimation method was used, as this is the most commonly used estimation 
method in SEM (Kline, 2011). To test the model’s fit, the maximum likelihood 
ratio Chi-Square (χ2), Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) statistics were used. Hypothesis II will be 
confirmed if several criteria are met. First, the overall model should fit the data; 
this will be determined if the Chi-Square (χ2) is not significant, if the CFI is > .90, 
and if the RMSEA value falls within its 10% confidence interval. If these criteria 
are not met within the first model, an additional model with theoretically 
                                                 
 
1 All observed variables had skewness and kurtosis values well below +/- 1.5. 
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appropriate respecifications (i.e. addition of error covariances) will be done to 
improve the model’s fit. In either case, if the model fits the data, then Hypothesis 
II will subsequently be confirmed if all five subscales are found to be significant 
predictors of the latent trait contempt construct.  
The first model was generally supportive of Hypothesis II, although it did 
not fully meet the abovementioned criteria for fit statistics. Specifically, the 
maximum likelihood Chi-Square was significant, χ2 = 31.10, p < .001. However, 
the RMSEA value did fall within the 90% confidence interval, RMSEA = .10, 
90% CI = [0.07, 0.14], and the model’s CFI was very high, CFI = .98; the latter 
two statistics indicated an acceptable fit. Additionally, all five subscales were 
significant predictors of a latent trait contempt construct, with moderate to strong 
factor loadings, which was also supportive of Hypothesis II. However, the 
modification indices suggested that adding several error covariances would 
substantially increase the model’s fit. Specifically, it suggested adding error 
covariances between the cold feelings and avoidant action tendency subscale with 
(1) the psychological distancing subscale and (2) the superiority and social 
standard violation awareness subscale. I determined that these suggestions were 
theoretically appropriate, as similar types of error could all be affecting these 
three subscales (e.g., social desirability, mood state, etc.). The modification 
indices also suggested adding error covariances between the superiority and social 
standards subscale and the derogatory action tendencies subscale. I determined 
that this error covariance was also theoretically appropriate, as both subscales 
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pertain to negative and critical views of others, and thus might be affected by 
similar types of error. 
A second CFA model was tested, which incorporated the abovementioned 
error covariances. This model had substantially better fit statistics, χ2 = .76, p = 
.68, RMSEA < .01, 90% CI = [0.0, 0.07], CFI = 1.00. In regard to the second 
model, Hypothesis II was fully confirmed; all five subscales were significant 
predictors of a latent trait contempt construct (at p < .05), with moderate to strong 
factor loadings. Psychological distancing (λ = .87), cold feelings with avoidant 
action tendencies (λ = .83), and negative dispositional attributions (λ = .75) had 
the strongest factor loadings, while derogatory action tendencies (λ = .63) and 
feelings of superiority with social standard violation awareness (λ = .49) had more 
moderate loadings.  For a list of all parameter estimates, their standard errors, 
error covariances, and R2 values, see Table 2. For the path diagram, see Figure 3. 
 Discussion of Hypotheses I & II: The Factor Structure of the Trait 
Contempt Scale and Construct. The results of the internal reliability analyses, 
exploratory factor analyses (EFA), and the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) all 
indicated that the trait contempt instrument fits the criteria for construct validity, 
both within each individual subscale and within the omnibus scale comprised of 
those subscales. The results of the EFA  also indicated that an emotional and 
interpersonal coldness factor (cold feelings and avoidant action tendencies) 
explained the largest amount of common variance among the items. The 
subsequent CFA indicated that this interpersonal coldness factor, along with 
psychological distancing, accounted for the greatest amount of variance in the 
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overall trait contempt construct. It is noteworthy that these dimensions can 
essentially be described as the affective, behavioral, and cognitive aspects of 
“coldness.” As such, these coldness-related dimensions likely represent the 
“primary” elements of trait contempt, and potentially state contempt as well.  
 The other dimensions – social standards, superiority, negative attributions, 
and derogatory action tendencies – all accounted for moderate to strong amounts 
of variance in the trait contempt construct. A common thread among all these 
dimensions is that they are different manifestations of an “other-critical” bias. The 
results of the EFA and CFA indicated that these other-critical dimensions are a 
meaningful and contributive aspect of the trait contempt construct. However, the 
other-critical dimensions explained relatively less variance than the coldness-
related dimensions. This indicated that the other-critical dimensions likely 
represent the “secondary” elements of trait contempt, and potentially state 
contempt as well.  
Hypothesis III: Testing the Discriminant and Convergent Validity of the 
Comprehensive Trait Contempt Scale 
Hypothesis IIIa predicted that this study’s trait contempt instrument would 
have discriminant validity from both the trait anger and trait disgust scales. 
Hypothesis IIIb predicted that this study’s trait contempt instrument would have 
convergent validity with the two alternative trait contempt instruments.  Because 
negative trait emotions share a moderate amount of variance (Izard et al., 1993), 
these hypotheses were tested using a principle components analysis (PCA). In 
contrast to the principle axis factoring used in Hypothesis I, PCAs incorporate the 
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unique variance of each included item, and are ideal to use when the distinctions 
between each factor is of theoretical interest (Pett et al., 2013). The PCA used a 
varimax rotation and a forced 3-factor solution. The omnibus mean of the five 
trait contempt subscales – henceforth referred to as comprehensive trait contempt 
– was used to represent this study’s trait contempt variable in the PCA. The PCA 
also included means for Izard’s trait contempt, disgust, and anger instruments. 
Finally, it also included two means from Crowley’s trait contempt expression 
instrument (2013); one was the mean of the instrument’s interpersonal coldness 
items, and the other was the mean of the instruments open expression of verbal 
hostility items.  
Discriminant validity will be demonstrated if trait contempt, trait disgust, 
and trait anger load onto three separate factors. Convergent validity will be 
demonstrated if all three trait contempt means load onto a single factor. However, 
convergent validity would still be demonstrated in the event that the mean for 
Crowley’s (2013) contempt expression subscale loads onto trait anger rather than 
the trait contempt factor because anger has an approach action tendency, and the 
open expression of verbal dislike could relate to anger (Haidt, 2003). 
Results of principle components analysis. See Table 3 for correlations 
between all variables used in the analyses. The results of the principle 
components analysis did not match the predicted pattern. First, a general negative 
trait emotion factor contained all three of Izard’s trait anger (.84), contempt (.75), 
and disgust scales (.85), along with the comprehensive trait contempt instrument 
(.63). Because trait contempt loaded onto the same factor as trait anger and 
66 
 
disgust, these results did not confirm Hypothesis III in regard to trait contempt’s 
discriminant validity. A second “coldness” factor contained Crowley’s 
interpersonal coldness subscale (.84) and also contained the comprehensive trait 
contempt scale, which had a factor loading equal to that of the first factor (.63). 
These results partially confirmed Hypothesis III in regard to trait contempt’s 
convergent validity with Crowley’s coldness subscale.  Finally, a third factor 
contained Crowley’s verbal hostility subscale (.87), on its own, which neither 
confirmed nor disconfirmed Hypothesis III. Theoretically, it was difficult to 
discern what was driving the comprehensive trait contempt instrument to load 
equally onto two separate factors in these results; one possible explanation for this 
is the multidimensionality of trait contempt. It could be that the two equal 
loadings may have been driven by different dimensions of trait contempt for the 
general negative trait emotion factor than they were for the coldness factor. In 
order to determine whether these similar loadings were being driven by specific 
dimensions of the comprehensive trait contempt instrument, I did an additional 
PCA.  
The additional PCA included the five separate contempt subscales as 
variables, rather than the single comprehensive trait contempt variable; it had no 
fixed factor solution, used a varimax rotation, and retained all factors with 
eigenvalues > 1. This resulted in a two factor solution. In keeping with the initial 
PCA, the first factor contained Izard’s trait contempt (.69), anger (.82), and 
disgust (.70) instruments. However, the first factor also included two of the 
“other-critical” aspects of trait contempt – the derogatory action tendencies 
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subscale (.73) and the superiority and social standard violations subscale (.76). 
Combined, these items could perhaps be characterized as a general “social outrage 
and negativity” factor, such that they all may involve a negativity bias towards 
other people, coupled with an ease of experiencing negative emotions towards 
them. The content of this social outrage factor indicates that Hypothesis III was 
not confirmed in regard to the discriminant validity of the other-critical 
dimensions of trait contempt; however, their convergent validity was confirmed in 
regard to Izard’s trait contempt scale. 
The second factor contained Crowley’s interpersonal coldness (.89) and 
contempt expression (.79) subscales, along with the combined cold feelings and 
avoidant action tendencies subscale (.80) and psychological distancing subscale 
(.63). Combined, these items are best characterized as an emotional and 
interpersonal coldness factor. This finding confirms Hypothesis III regarding the 
discriminant and convergent validity of all coldness-related dimensions of the trait 
contempt instruments. Finally, the negative dispositional attribution subscale 
loaded about moderately and equally onto both factor one (.53) and factor two 
(.54), indicating that negative attributions may be equally involved in both social 
outrage and interpersonal coldness.  
Limitations of the analytical strategy. It is noteworthy that the chosen 
analytical strategy may have had several limitations, such that it may not have 
been the most appropriate type of model to use. Izard’s trait anger, disgust, and 
contempt instruments share a great deal of common variance (Izard et al., 1993); 
as such, principle axis factoring (PAF) may have been a more appropriate gauge 
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of the genuine factor structure behind the items. This is because PAF is typically 
recommended when factors are expected to intercorrelated (Pett et al., 2013). PAF 
also only retains the common variance among items; as such, this may provide a 
more stringent test of the coldness-related scales’ discriminant validity from the 
trait anger and disgust scales. Additionally, the choice of items to input into the 
PCA may have been a limitation; using scale means for Izard’s and Crowley’s 
instruments, rather than including all of their individual items, may have reduced 
the ability of the factor analysis to form separate factors for trait anger and 
disgust, potentially pushing the three scale means to load together more than they 
might have if they were each represented by multiple items instead. 
 With the abovementioned limitations in mind, I did a third factor analysis, 
this time a principle axis factoring model. It used a direct oblimin rotation and a 
forced three-factor solution. I included the five trait contempt subscale means, 
along with each individual item from Izard’s and Crowley’s scales. However, the 
results were qualitatively similar to the second factor analysis described in the 
previous section. All of Izard’s trait anger, contempt, and disgust items formed a 
single “other-critical” factor, which also included the superiority/social standards 
and derogatory action tendency subscales from my own trait contempt instrument. 
The second factor, again characterized by “emotional and interpersonal coldness,” 
was comprised of my instrument’s cold feelings and avoidant action tendencies 
subscale, along with all items from Crowley’s interpersonal coldness and 
contempt expression subscales. Finally, my instrument’s psychological distancing 
and negative dispositional attribution subscales formed a third factor; however, 
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these two subscales also loaded similarly well onto the first factor, and the 
psychological distancing subscale loaded moderately well onto the second factor. 
Thus, the change in analytical strategy did not appear to qualitatively change the 
overall pattern of results in a substantial manner.  
Discussion of Hypothesis III: Convergent and Discriminant Validity. 
The results of the second and third factor analyses helped clarify the degree of the 
comprehensive trait contempt instrument’s discriminant validity from trait anger 
and disgust, and its convergent validity with the other trait contempt instruments. 
As suspected, it did indeed appear that only certain dimensions of the 
comprehensive trait contempt instrument were loading onto the same factor as 
trait anger and disgust. Based on the results of the second and third factor 
analyses, the “other-critical” dimensions of the comprehensive trait contempt 
instrument appeared to be driving trait contempt’s loading onto a general negative 
trait emotion factor; thus, the other-critical dimensions initially led to discriminant 
validity being difficult to confirm for the comprehensive trait contempt instrument 
as a whole (i.e., in the first factor analysis). In contrast, the factor loadings of the 
coldness-related dimensions much more clearly indicated trait contempt’s 
discriminant validity from trait anger and trait disgust, and its convergent validity 
with other trait contempt instruments. These findings appear to be related to the 
results from Hypotheses I-II, in that they might also indicate that the coldness-
related dimensions represent the “primary” – and perhaps most unique – elements 
of the trait contempt construct. In contrast, the other-critical dimensions appeared 
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to explain relatively less variance to the overall construct in Hypotheses I-II, and 
the results from Hypothesis III might suggest that this is due a greater amount of 
common variance shared between trait contempt’s other-critical dimensions and 
both trait anger and trait disgust.  
 
Hypothesis IV: Does Trait Contempt Uniquely Predict Loyalty and 
Authority Values?     
 Hypothesis IV predicted that trait contempt would be a stronger predictor 
of loyalty and authority foundation valuation, compared to both trait anger and 
trait disgust. This was tested using two multiple regressions. Both regressions 
used this study’s comprehensive trait contempt scale, Izard’s trait anger, and 
Izard’s trait disgust as independent variables. The first regression used authority 
valuation as the dependent variable, whereas the second regression used loyalty 
valuation. In both cases, these were two-step hierarchical regressions, in which 
trait contempt was initially used as the sole predictor, and then trait anger and 
disgust were subsequently introduced as predictors in the second step. Hypothesis 
IV will be confirmed if trait contempt significantly predicts loyalty and authority 
values, if this relation remains significant after introducing trait anger and disgust 
into the model, and if the beta value of trait contempt is greater than the betas for 
both trait anger and trait disgust. Changes in the model’s R2 will be used to assist 
this decision if trait anger and/or disgust also significantly predict loyalty and 
authority values, and if their beta values are similar to trait contempt’s.   
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 Trait contempt as a predictor of authority values. In the first step of the 
hierarchical regression, although trait contempt did significantly predict authority 
values, the relation was negative, β = -.09, p = .042; additionally, the overall 
effect size of the first model was weak, R2adj = .01, F = 4.17, p = .042. After 
introducing trait anger and disgust, the second step’s overall effect size improved, 
R2adj = .03, F = 4.98, p = .007; trait contempt was no longer significant in the 
second model, β = -.07, p = .236. Unexpectedly, trait anger negatively predicted 
authority values, β = -.16, p = .011, and trait disgust positively predicted authority 
values, β = .16, p = .006. Thus, Hypothesis IV was not confirmed in regard to 
authority values. These results instead indicated that trait contempt shares a 
substantial amount of common variance with trait anger and/or disgust as a 
predictor of authority values.  
 Trait contempt as a predictor of loyalty values. The first step of the 
hierarchical regression for loyalty values was very similar to the one for authority 
values. Although trait contempt did significantly predict loyalty values, the 
relation was negative, β = -.10, p = .027 and the model’s effect size was weak but 
significant, R2adj = .01, F = 4.90, p = .027. Introducing trait anger and disgust as 
predictors increased the model’s effect size, R2adj = .02, F = 4.26, p = .015; in this 
case however, the trait contempt actually became a stronger predictor of loyalty 
values in the second model, β = -.17, p = .005. Trait anger did not predict loyalty 
values, β = -.02, p = .791, but trait disgust did positively predict loyalty values, β 
= .16, p = .006. As such, Hypothesis IV was not confirmed in regard to loyalty 
values. Given that trait contempt and disgust’s effect sizes were very similar, and 
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that the Δ R2 between models one and two could be explained by both the 
introduction of disgust and the increased effect size of contempt, it could not be 
determined that trait contempt was the strongest predictor of loyalty values. 
However, these results are intriguing, in that the direction of the relation between 
trait contempt and loyalty values were in the opposite direction of the predicted 
relation. 
 Discussion of Hypothesis IV: Trait contempt and moral values. The 
most unexpected finding in regard to moral values was that trait contempt 
negatively predicted loyalty values with a moderate effect size. This finding may 
imply that people with stronger loyalty values are more likely to be emotionally 
and interpersonally warm and are less likely to think and speak negatively of 
others. In retrospect, this finding does seem to be intuitive, given that loyalty 
values involve social harmony and cohesion. However, this was puzzling as I did 
not come across any theoretical basis for this in the literature. The only seemingly 
related study looked at moral foundation values and trait agreeableness – which 
involves interpersonal warmth (Hirsh, DeYoung, Xu, & Peterson, 2010); 
however, they found that trait agreeableness did not significantly relate to loyalty 
values (2010). These puzzling results indicate that further analysis of the Study 1 
data would be merited. A path model or multiple regression that includes all five 
trait contempt subscales as predictors of loyalty values might illuminate which 
dimensions are predominately driving this negative relation, and whether certain 
dimensions of trait contempt might have positive associations with loyalty values. 
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Trait emotions and the CAD model. The results of Hypothesis IV generally 
indicated that the CAD model does not neatly apply to the relations between 
negative trait emotions and the moral foundations. Trait contempt did not 
uniquely relate to authority values, and negatively associated with loyalty values. 
These findings suggest that trait contempt does not fit within the CAD pattern. 
More broadly, the results for Hypothesis IV also cast doubt on the wider 
prediction that trait emotions generally adhere to the CAD pattern. Unexpectedly, 
both trait anger and disgust associated with authority values, and had larger effect 
sizes than did trait contempt; similarly, trait disgust predicted loyalty values in the 
direction that trait contempt was originally expected to (positive). In both cases, 
these results do not fit with the domain-specificity of emotions described in 
research based on the CAD model.  
Trait contempt and other moral values. Given that Study 1’s findings did not 
closely correspond to the CAD model, further analysis is needed in regard to 
whether or not trait emotions function differently from state emotions as 
predictors of moral values and judgment (with the exception of trait disgust). For 
instance, it may be the case that although state contempt is elicited by authority 
and loyalty violations, trait contempt may function somewhat differently as a 
predictor of moral values – as indicated by the negative relation between trait 
contempt and loyalty. A similar type of discrepancy was found between trait 
anger and state anger in a study by Horberg and colleagues (2009); although 
justice (fairness) violations were found to predict state anger responses, trait anger 
did not predict fairness values (Horberg et al., 2009). Thus, it may be the case that 
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trait contempt – compared to state contempt – may play a substantially different 
role as an influence on moral values. Considering that loyalty values were 
negatively predicted by trait contempt, it might be the case that trait contempt 
negatively predicts other kinds of moral values. 
Along these lines, one study found that harm/care values were positively 
related to trait empathy (Graham et al., 2011). Considering that contempt is 
partially defined by a lack or loss of empathy (cold feelings and psychological 
distancing) towards a target, a unique negative relation between trait contempt 
and harm/care values is worth further exploration with the Study 1 data; indeed, a 
preliminary side analysis confirmed that trait contempt did indeed uniquely 
associate with harm/care values2. Considering that Hutcherson and Gross (2011) 
proposed that contempt may have evolutionary origins in identifying and avoiding 
“bad group members” who do not contribute or pull their own weight, it would 
also be worth testing the relation between trait contempt and reciprocity values3. 
This is because reciprocity values can in part be characterized by a dislike of free-
riding behaviors and a desire to have people rewarded in proportion to their effort 
                                                 
 
2 In a side analysis, I ran a multiple regression model which included trait anger, disgust, and 
contempt as predictors of harm/care values. Trait contempt was found to be the sole significant 
predictor of harm/care values, with a moderate and negative effect (β = -.31, p < .001).   
3 In a side analysis, I ran a multiple regression model with all five moral foundations (plus 
reciprocity) as predictors of trait contempt. Trait contempt significantly predicted reciprocity 
values (β = .32, p < .001) and harm/care values (β = -.28) with a moderate effect. However, trait 
contempt did not uniquely predict reciprocity values in a regression which also included trait anger 
and disgust as variables.  
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or contribution (Haidt, 2012). With this in mind, further analysis of all three trait 
contempt instruments in relation to the five moral foundations may provide 
theoretically interesting and novel results.  
Hypothesis V: Is the Omnibus Trait Contempt Instrument a Stronger 
Predictor of Moral Values than the Pre-existing Instruments? 
Hypothesis V predicts that this study’s trait contempt instrument will be a 
stronger predictor of loyalty and authority foundation valuation than both of the 
alternative trait contempt instruments. This was tested using two confirmatory 
factor analyses. The mean scores for each trait contempt instrument (Izard’s, 
Crowley’s, and this study’s) were calculated, and each mean was treated as a 
separate observed variable which were subsequently used as predictors for loyalty 
values (model 1) and authority values (model 2). Hypothesis V would be 
confirmed if the paths for this study’s trait contempt instrument are significant for 
both foundations, and if this path’s relation is stronger than those of the other two 
instruments’ paths.  
 Path models. Correlations for each of the abovementioned observed 
variables were calculated using listwise deletion (Table 4). The table’s covariance 
matrix was used for both path analyses (n = 460). In the first path model, all three 
trait contempt instrument paths were significant predictors of loyalty values at p < 
.05; λ Izard = .09, [δ =.05], λ Crowley = .04, [δ =.05], λ Comprehensive contempt = -.24, [δ 
=.08], error variance = .74, [δ =.05], R2 = .02. Thus, in regard to loyalty values, 
Hypothesis V was partially confirmed. This study’s trait contempt instrument was 
the strongest predictor of loyalty values among the three different trait contempt 
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scales; however, the direction of the relation was negative, which was opposite of 
the predicted direction.  
In the second path model, all three trait contempt instruments were 
significant predictors of authority values at p < .05; λ Izard = .07, [δ =.05], λ Crowley 
= -.01, [δ =.05], λ Comprehensive contempt = -.16, [δ =.08], error variance = .81, [δ =.05], 
R2 = .01. Thus, in regard to authority values, Hypothesis V was partially 
confirmed; this study’s trait contempt instrument was the strongest predictor of 
authority values among the three different trait contempt scales; once again, 
however, the relation was opposite of the predicted direction. See Figure 4 for the 
path diagrams of both models. 
Improvement over other trait contempt scales. The results from 
Hypothesis V may indicate that the comprehensive trait contempt instrument is 
able to account for substantially more variance in moral values than both Izard’s 
and Crowley’s instruments. In broad theoretical terms, the comprehensive trait 
contempt scale appears to be an improvement over the only two pre-existing trait 
contempt scales, in terms of its multidimensionality and the wider breadth of item 
content. For instance, while Crowley’s trait contempt expression instrument 
(2013) does include a coldness dimension, this study’s coldness subscale appears 
to be an improvement. Specifically, Crowley’s emotional coldness subscale has 
very little breadth of content; all four of its items are small variations of the 
phrase “I [am / am not] a cold person.” This study’s trait coldness instrument’s 
cold feelings subscale covers a wider range of thoughts, feelings, and behavior 
pertaining to coldness in addition to cold/warm terminology.  
77 
 
The three items in Izard and colleagues’ trait contempt instrument (1993) 
are measured almost exclusively in terms of feelings of superiority. As such, this 
study’s trait contempt instrument is a significant improvement. It contains a wider 
range of superiority and similar other-critical items. More importantly, it also 
incorporates measures of other dimensions, which in terms of effect size, were 
substantially stronger contributors to the overall trait contempt construct. As such, 
this study’s instrument appears to have more explanatory power and broader 
potential applications for future research than both Izard’s and Crowley’s scales.  
Study 2  
In order to avoid the semantic confounds associated with the word 
“contempt,” Study 1 was designed to assess trait contempt by breaking down 
contempt into several key characteristics (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Haidt, 
2003). Study 2, in contrast, will avoid these semantic confounds by means of 
having participants match pictures of facial expressions to short scenarios. This 
type of facial expression matching task has proven successful in assessing 
contempt in previous research (Rosenburg & Ekman, 1995; Rozin et al., 1999). In 
short, participants will read brief descriptions of moral violations, and will then 
rate three photos of facial expressions depicting contempt, anger, and disgust 
according to how strongly they feel the depicted emotion towards the described 
event.  
 The use of a facial expression rating task may be particularly valuable 
because it can help resolve several gaps in the moral emotion literature. First, 
Study 2 will be designed to explicitly test the assumed link between the CAD 
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emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust) and the five moral foundations.  It will do 
so by expanding upon the original CAD hypothesis study to include content from 
the five moral foundations, rather than merely the three ethics of autonomy, 
community, and divinity (Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 1993).  
To briefly review, the CAD hypothesis study demonstrated links between 
contempt and community violations, anger and autonomy violations, and disgust 
and divinity violations. It has been mostly assumed that contempt, anger, and 
disgust are differentially elicited by violations of different moral foundations, 
primarily since the moral foundations are directly derived from Shweder’s three 
ethics (Alderman et al., 2010; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder 
et al., 1997). And indeed studies have found that purity violations elicit disgust, 
and fairness/reciprocity violations elicit anger (Horberg et al., 2009). However, it 
does not appear that any published study has specifically tested which moral 
foundation violations elicit contempt, nor has any published study included all 
three CAD emotions and their relation to violations of each of the five moral 
foundations. Additionally, it appears that no published study has replicated Rozin 
and colleagues’ methodology and applied it to the five moral foundations (1999).  
Study 2 will also further explore the comprehensive trait contempt scale’s 
relation to morality; while Study 1 looked at trait contempt as a predictor of moral 
values, Study 2 will investigate whether trait contempt predicts specific patterns 
of moral judgment towards value-violating behaviors. The comprehensive trait 
contempt instrument will also be compared with contempt facial expression 
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ratings, to determine if trait contempt predicts more severe contemptuous 
reactions across all types of moral scenarios.        
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis VIa. It is predicted that contempt faces will be rated at 
significantly greater magnitudes than both anger and disgust faces following 
scenarios depicting loyalty and authority violations.  
Hypothesis VIb. It is predicted that loyalty and authority scenarios will 
have greater contempt face magnitudes than the other scenario types.  
Hypothesis VIc. It is predicted that anger faces will be rated at 
significantly greater magnitudes than both contempt and disgust faces following 
scenarios depicting harm, fairness, and reciprocity violations. 
Hypothesis VId. It is predicted that harm, fairness, and reciprocity 
scenarios will have greater anger face magnitudes than all other scenario types.  
Hypothesis VIe. It is predicted that disgust faces will be rated at 
significantly greater magnitudes than both contempt and anger faces following 
scenarios depicting purity violations.  
Hypothesis VIf. It is predicted that purity scenarios will have greater 
disgust face magnitudes than all other scenario types.  
Hypothesis VIIa. It is predicted that trait contempt will positively relate 
to contempt expression magnitudes across all scenario types, and that this relation 
will be stronger than trait anger and trait disgust’s relation to contempt expression 
magnitudes.  
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Hypothesis VIIb. It is predicted that trait disgust will positively relate to 
disgust expression magnitudes across all scenario types, and that this relation will 
be stronger than trait anger and trait contempt’s relation to disgust expression 
magnitudes. 
Hypothesis VIIc. It is predicted that trait anger will positively relate to 
anger expression magnitudes across all scenario types, and that this relation will 
be stronger than trait contempt and trait disgust’s relation to anger expression 
magnitudes. 
Hypothesis VIII. It is predicted that trait contempt will positively relate to 
immorality judgments towards both the actor and their behavior within loyalty 
and authority violation scenarios. 
Method 
Study 2 used a within-subjects experimental design. Participants took an 
online survey where they read scenarios depicting moral violations representing 
the five moral foundations (plus reciprocity violations) and completed a facial 
expression-rating task after each scenario, along with items assessing trait 
contempt, trait disgust, trait anger, and demographics.  
Participants 
Participants (N = 237) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 
Their mean age was 40.29 (SD = 12.81). They were 49.8% female and 28.3% 
male – 21.9% did not report their gender. In terms of race and ethnicity, 
participants were: Caucasian (57.8%), African American (9.3%), Asian (5.1%), 
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Latino/a (3.4%), “Other” or bi-racial (5.5%), and a number of participants did not 
report their race (19%).   
Procedure 
Participants took an online survey via Amazon’s M-Turk. After being 
briefed, participants completed a series of facial expression rating tasks, as well as 
several trait emotion instruments. These two sections of the survey were 
randomized in order to provide for counterbalancing. In the facial expression-
rating tasks, participants first read a moral scenario (the order of scenarios was 
randomized); Each scenario described a person engaging in a behavior that 
violates one of the moral foundations. Next, they completed three facial 
expression rating measures (contempt, anger, and disgust), which were presented 
in a random order. Then they completed three moral judgment items, in a 
randomized order. When participants completed all measures related to the 
scenario, they clicked a “next” button and moved on to the next scenario, and 
repeated the process again until all of the scenarios were rated. Participants 
completed Izard’s trait contempt, disgust, and anger instruments, along with 
Study 1’s comprehensive trait contempt instrument. The order of the trait emotion 
instruments was randomized, as were the order of the items within each 
instrument. Finally, participants were debriefed about the purpose of the study 
and exited the survey.   
Materials 
 Moral scenarios. There were 18 scenarios in total (for the full list of 
scenarios, see Appendix C).  There were three scenarios apiece for violations of 
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the harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity foundations. There were also 
three scenarios depicting reciprocity violations, as opposed to general fairness 
violations. The majority of the moral foundation scenarios were adapted from a 
study by Graham and Haidt (2012). The following items are several examples of 
these adapted scenarios: harm violation: a man “kicks a dog in the head, hard” 
(Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 28); loyalty violation: an American woman harshly 
criticizes the United States on a “talk radio station in a foreign nation” (p. 28); 
authority violation: a woman “slaps her father in the face” during an argument (p. 
28).  
Facial expression magnitude ratings. After reading a scenario, 
participants were shown three photos of facial expressions, which depicted the 
contempt, anger, and disgust expressions. All three photos were of the same 
female model, shown in Figure 5, and were taken from the Standard Expressor 
Version of the Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions of Emotion (JACFEE; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988).  On top of each photo was a label with the name of 
that photo’s emotional expression. Underneath each photo was a 7-point scale (1 
= not at all, 7 = very much). Participants were instructed to rate all three 
emotions, and to rate any emotions they do not feel at all as a “1.” For an example 
of this task’s layout, see Appendix B. Given that each moral foundation had three 
scenarios (thus leading to three contempt, anger, and disgust ratings per violation 
type), within-foundation scales were calculated for: contempt ratings (harm α = 
.61; fairness α = .80; reciprocity α = .76; loyalty α = .70; authority α = .78; purity 
α = .75); for anger ratings (harm α = .51; fairness α = .65; reciprocity α = .69; 
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loyalty = .76; authority α = .76; purity α = .77); and for disgust ratings (harm α = 
.57; fairness α = .76; reciprocity α = .75; loyalty α = .75; authority α = .82; purity 
α = .63). These within-foundation emotion rating scales were used in all 
subsequent analyses.  
 Moral judgment items. After completing the facial expression rating 
measures, participants then answered three items relating to their judgments of the 
scenario content. Using 7-point scales, participants rated the following items: how 
immoral was the depicted behavior (1 = not immoral at all, 7 = extremely 
immoral); how immoral was the person who did this behavior (1 = not immoral at 
all, 7 = extremely immoral); and how conventional was the behavior (1 = not 
conventional/typical at all, 7 = extremely conventional/typical). For each scenario 
type, mean scores on the first item – immorality judgments of the behavior – were 
used as a measurement of participants’ individual differences in moral foundation 
valuation.  Within each moral foundation, moral judgments towards the behavior 
were scaled together (harm α = .60; fairness α = .68; reciprocity α = .60; loyalty α 
= .70; authority α = .76; purity α = .80). Similarly, within each moral foundation, 
moral judgments towards the person were scaled together (harm α = .56; fairness 
α = .62; reciprocity α = .59; loyalty α = .71; authority α = .75; purity α = .80). 
These within-foundation moral judgment scales were used in all subsequent 
analyses.  
 Trait emotion instruments. Participants completed four trait emotion 
instruments: two of these assessed trait contempt, one assessed trait anger, and 
one assessed trait disgust. The first trait contempt instrument contained the 
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majority of the items from the Study 1 comprehensive trait contempt instrument; 
however, several poor-loading items were removed from the scale based on the 
results of Study 1’s factor analyses. The trait anger, trait disgust, and the second 
trait contempt instrument were directly taken from the updated differential 
emotion scale (DES), created by Izard and colleagues (1993), and were identical 
to those used in Study 1, and used the same 7-point scale ranging from 1 (very 
rarely) to 7 (very frequently). An attention check item was also put in this section 
of the survey.  
Demographics. After completing both the facial expression rating task 
and the trait emotion instruments, participants completed demographic items 
pertaining to age, gender, race, education, and age. They also completed items 
related to political ideology. All demographic items were identical to those used 
in Study 1.  
Results and Discussion 
Data Preparation 
 Out of the original 237 participants, 29 participants were dropped for 
failing the attention check item, 17 were dropped for leaving one or more major 
survey sections blank (excluding demographics), and 21 participants were 
dropped for completing the task in less than 9 minutes; Time trials indicated that 
it was not feasible to complete all of the survey questions, facial expression 
matching, trait emotion, and demographic items under this time span. This 
resulted in a final N of 170.  
Hypothesis VI: Does the CAD Model Apply to the Five Moral Foundations?  
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Hypothesis VI predicts that Rozin and colleagues’ CAD model (1999) will 
be applicable to the five moral foundations. Specifically, Hypotheses VIa, VIc, 
and VIe predicted that facial expression ratings would match the CAD pattern 
within each scenario type. Hypotheses VIb, VId, and VIf predicted that facial 
expression ratings would match the CAD pattern between each scenario type. 
These predictions were tested using a 3 (contempt, anger, disgust) by 6 (harm, 
fairness, reciprocity, loyalty, authority, purity) within-subjects ANOVA4; results 
of the within-subjects ANOVA were interpreted by comparing the 95% 
confidence intervals of facial expression rating magnitudes within each type of 
scenario. Hypothesis I will be fully confirmed if these 95% confidence intervals 
are significantly different both within- and between-scenarios in accordance with 
the CAD pattern. 
Repeated measures results. Graphs of facial expression ratings organized 
by moral scenario type can be seen in Figure 6. Given that there were 18 variables 
(3 emotions x 6 scenario types), it is not surprising that Mauchley’s test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity was not met for scenario type, χ2 = 91.19, p < 
.001, emotion type, χ2 = 40.78, p < .001, or for the interaction between emotion 
and scenario type, χ2 = 401.79, p < .001; therefore, Greenhouse Geisser values 
                                                 
 
4 Given that each moral foundation had three scenarios, and thus three contempt, anger, and 
disgust ratings apiece, the within-foundation emotion-rating scales (described in the materials 
section), were used in the within-subjects ANOVA. 
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were used for subsequent interpretations. There was a significant within-subjects 
main effect of scenario type, Greenhouse-Geisser F (3.92, 556.97) = 51.21, p < 
.001, η2 = .27; this indicated that certain types of scenarios elicited all three 
emotions more strongly than other scenarios, which complicated the interpretation 
of emotion magnitudes between scenarios. There was a significant interaction 
between scenario type and emotion type, Greenhouse-Geisser F (5.50, 781.24) = 
82.21, p < .001, η2 = .37; in keeping with Hypothesis VI, this indicated that 
certain emotions were elicited more strongly in certain types of scenarios. Finally, 
there was not a significant within-subjects main effect of emotion, Greenhouse-
Geisser F (1.60, 226.99) = .49, p = .571, η2 = .00; in keeping with Hypothesis VI, 
this indicated that no single emotion was elicited more strongly than the other two 
emotions across all scenario types.  
Does contempt match the CAD pattern for loyalty and authority 
violations? See Table 5 for all emotion rating means and 95% confidence 
intervals that were used in the following interpretations. Hypothesis VIa predicted 
that contempt faces would be rated at significantly greater magnitudes than both 
anger and disgust faces within scenarios depicting loyalty and authority 
violations. Comparisons of the 95% confidence intervals of the three emotion 
ratings within loyalty scenarios indicated that there was no significant difference 
in magnitude between contempt, anger, and disgust ratings. Therefore, Hypothesis 
VIa was not confirmed for loyalty violation scenarios. Regarding authority 
scenarios, contempt ratings. However, contempt ratings did not significantly 
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differ from anger ratings; therefore Hypothesis VIa was not confirmed for 
authority values.  
 Hypothesis VIb predicted that loyalty and authority scenarios will have 
greater contempt face magnitudes than the other moral scenario types. In regard to 
loyalty values, the opposite of the predicted results emerged; loyalty scenarios had 
significantly lower contempt ratings than all other moral scenario types (as seen in 
Table 5). However, given that contempt, anger, and disgust ratings were not 
significantly different within loyalty scenarios (see results of Hypothesis VIa), 
this result appears to be driven by a main effect of loyalty scenarios – relatively 
lower emotional reactions in general – rather than a distinct relation between 
loyalty violations and lower contempt responses.  In either case, Hypothesis VIb 
was not confirmed in regard to loyalty scenarios.  
In regard to authority scenarios, they did not appear to have the strongest 
contempt responses. Rather, fairness and reciprocity violations had the strongest 
contempt responses. Contempt responses did not significantly differ between 
fairness and reciprocity scenarios, but contempt responses were significantly 
greater in fairness scenarios compared to all other remaining scenario types. 
Contempt reactions in authority scenarios did not significantly differ from those 
in harm and purity scenarios. Thus, Hypothesis VIb was not confirmed in regard 
to authority scenarios.  
Does anger match the CAD pattern for harm, fairness, and reciprocity 
violations? See Table 5 for all emotion rating means and 95% confidence 
intervals used in the following interpretations. Hypothesis VIc predicted that 
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anger faces will be rated at significantly greater magnitudes than both contempt 
and disgust faces within scenarios depicting harm, fairness, and reciprocity 
violations. In regard to harm scenarios, anger means did not significantly differ 
from disgust or contempt means. In regard to fairness scenarios, anger means did 
not significantly differ from contempt means, although anger responses were 
significantly greater than disgust responses. In a similar fashion, anger means 
were significantly greater than disgust means within reciprocity scenarios, but 
they were not significantly different than contempt means. Thus, Hypothesis VIc 
was not fully confirmed for harm, fairness, or reciprocity scenarios; however 
anger was elicited to a more than disgust for the latter two scenario types, which 
replicates previous findings in the moral emotion literature.  
Hypothesis VId predicted that harm, fairness, and reciprocity scenarios 
will have greater anger face magnitudes than all other scenario types. Hypothesis 
VId was fully confirmed for all three scenario types. Harm scenarios had 
significantly greater anger ratings than all other scenario types except reciprocity. 
Reciprocity and fairness violation scenarios had greater anger ratings than all 
remaining scenario types. 
 Does disgust match the CAD purity violations? See Table 5 for all 
emotion rating means and 95% confidence intervals used in the following 
interpretations. Hypothesis VIe predicted that disgust faces would be rated at 
significantly greater magnitudes than both contempt and anger faces within 
scenarios depicting purity violations. Hypothesis VIe was confirmed. Purity 
violations elicited stronger disgust responses than both contempt and anger 
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responses, by a wide margin.  Another noteworthy finding within this comparison 
was that contempt reactions to purity violations were significantly greater than 
anger reactions. Hypothesis VIf predicted that purity scenarios will have greater 
disgust face magnitudes than all other scenario types. Hypothesis VIf was also 
confirmed. Disgust reactions in purity scenarios were significantly greater than all 
other scenario types, by a wide margin. As expected, findings from previous 
studies on moral emotions were replicated in this analysis; Hypothesis VI was 
fully confirmed in regard to the relation between purity violations and disgust.   
 Discussion of Hypothesis VI: Does the CAD pattern apply to the 
moral foundations? The results from Hypothesis VI indicated that the CAD 
pattern does not clearly map onto the moral foundations, with the exception of 
disgust’s relation to purity violations. A main effect of scenario type often 
accounted for a large amount of the variance in facial expression ratings, such that 
certain types of scenarios elicited more severe reactions across all three negative 
emotions. This made between-scenario comparisons of any individual emotion 
difficult to interpret. Harm, fairness, and reciprocity scenarios tended to elicit the 
strongest magnitudes, whereas loyalty and authority scenarios tended to elicit the 
lowest facial expression rating magnitudes across all three emotions. In contrast to 
the CAD model, these results generally indicated that most types of moral 
violations tend to elicit multiple emotional responses, rather than a single discrete 
emotional response.  
 Interactions between emotion type and scenario type also accounted for a 
large amount of variance in certain instances and tended to more closely 
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correspond with the predicted CAD pattern. Specifically, anger was more strongly 
associated with harm, fairness, and reciprocity violations than was disgust, 
whereas disgust was more strongly associated with purity violations than was 
anger. However, In regard to this study’s unique contribution—testing whether 
loyalty and authority violations predominately elicit contempt—the CAD model 
was disconfirmed. These two types of violations did not predominately elicit 
contempt over anger and disgust. Indeed, with the exception of purity violations, 
contempt was never significantly different from either anger or disgust ratings.  
 It is noteworthy that contempt never had the lowest magnitude among the 
three CAD emotions. Rather, it was statistically similar to all three emotions, with 
the exception of purity violations, where it was significantly lower than disgust 
but significantly greater than anger. These findings generally do not support this 
study’s broad prediction that contempt is uniquely or discretely associated with 
certain types of moral violations. However, these results may also indicate that 
contempt is not simply a “weaker” or low arousal version of anger or disgust.  
 One possible explanation for the mixed results in the present study is that 
the original CAD study may have overstated the degree to which emotions are 
uniquely associated with one moral violation type. Specifically, the original CAD 
study used a single categorical choice paradigm, such that participants could only 
select one emotion, and they could not rate the magnitude of their emotional 
reactions in the facial expression selection task (Rozin et al., 1999). This approach 
did not consider shared variance between negative emotional reactions, and it 
failed to account for the strong elicitation of multiple emotional reactions towards 
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a single moral stimuli. Indeed, an additional analysis of the present study’s data 
indicated that moral judgments towards all six types of moral foundation 
violations significantly predicted all three emotional responses with moderate to 
strong effect sizes.5 Combined with the previously described results of 
Hypothesis VI, this indicates that there is a great deal of shared variance between 
the CAD emotions, and that all types of moral violations elicit multiple emotional 
reactions.  
Hypothesis VII: Do Trait Emotions predict their Corresponding Emotion’s 
Expression Ratings Across all Scenario Types? 
Hypothesis VIIa predicts that trait contempt will positively relate to 
contempt expression magnitudes across all scenario types, and that this relation 
will be stronger than trait anger and trait disgust’s relation to contempt expression 
ratings. Hypothesis VIIb predicts that trait disgust will positively relate to disgust 
expression magnitudes across all scenario types, and that this relation will be 
stronger than trait anger and trait contempt’s relation to disgust expression ratings. 
Hypothesis VIIc predicts that trait anger will positively relate to anger expression 
magnitudes across all scenario types, and that this relation will be stronger than 
trait contempt and trait disgust’s relation to anger expression ratings. Succinctly, 
                                                 
 
5 Correlations between moral judgment of the action, the person, and contempt/disgust/anger face 
ratings were done for each type of moral foundation violation. Both kinds of moral judgment 
significantly correlated with all three facial expression ratings at r > .40, and p < .001; with the 
majority of correlations being r > .55.  
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these hypotheses predict that a facial expression’s magnitude mean across all 
scenario types can serve as a measure of that expression’s related trait emotion.  
These predictions were tested using correlations. Correlations were 
calculated between trait contempt, trait disgust, trait anger, and the overall means 
for the contempt, anger, and disgust expressions. Hypothesis IIa will be fully 
confirmed if the relation between each trait emotion and its corresponding 
emotion’s facial expressions are significant, positive, and if their correlation is 
greater than the correlations between that facial expression and the other two trait 
emotions. In the event that multiple trait emotions positively predict one 
emotion’s facial expression ratings, Fisher’s R to Z transformation will be used to 
compare these two correlations; this test can assess whether two correlations are 
significantly different from one another, and provides a p value for this test (Zar, 
1999).  
Trait contempt omnibus scale. Prior to calculating the correlations, an 
omnibus trait contempt mean needed to be calculated. Due to limitations on the 
number of items that this study could reasonably include, several of the original 
trait contempt items from Study 1 were not included in Study 2 (the removed 
items mostly coincided with the items identified as having the lowest factor 
loadings in Study 1). With this in mind, subscales were created in a way that 
matched the content and structure of the five factors/subscales from Study 1 as 
closely as possible. Means were calculated for the following five subscales: cold 
feelings with avoidant action tendencies, feelings of superiority with social 
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standard violation awareness, psychological distancing, negative dispositional 
attributions, and derogatory action tendencies.  
Internal reliabilities were calculated for each trait contempt subscale, to 
make sure their internal consistency from Study 1 replicated. The subscales had 
the following internal consistencies: the cold feelings with avoidant action 
tendencies (14 items; α = .90); feelings of superiority with standard violation 
awareness (13 items; α = .90); negative dispositional attributions (5 items, α = 
.88); psychological distancing (8 items; α = .80); and derogatory action tendencies 
(7 items; α = .87). When all five subscales were combined into an omnibus trait 
contempt scale, they had an acceptable internal reliability (α = .89).  
Correlations. Correlations were calculated between the omnibus trait 
contempt scale, trait anger, trait disgust, and the grand means for the facial 
expression ratings of contempt, anger, and disgust. This correlation table can be 
found in Table 6. Hypotheses VIIa, VIIb, and VIIc predicted that a facial 
expression’s rating grand mean (across all scenario types) could serve as a 
measure of that expression’s related trait emotion. All three predictions were 
strongly disconfirmed. No facial expression rating mean of any kind significantly 
related to any trait emotion at p < .05.6 Instead, all three trait emotions had 
                                                 
 
6 However, trait contempt marginally and negatively related to disgust face rating means at a 
marginal p = .071. 
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moderately strong correlations amongst themselves, and all three facial expression 
rating means had moderately strong correlations amongst themselves.  
Discussion of Hypothesis VII: Can facial expression ratings be used as 
a measure of trait emotions? These abovementioned findings strongly 
disconfirmed Hypothesis VII, as none of the trait emotions significantly related to 
any of the facial expression ratings. While facial expression photo ratings might 
still be a potential way to assess trait emotions in some other type of 
methodology, this clearly was not the case within the context of emotionally 
responding to moral scenarios. However, it could be the case that any relations 
between trait emotions and facial expression ratings were diluted due to the 
scaling of all six moral scenario types. Future analyses on Study 2’s data might be 
merited in respect to the relation between trait emotions and their corresponding 
facial expression ratings within individual scenario types, as opposed to simply 
using the grand means of each of the emotional expression’s ratings. However, 
some preliminary analyses did not support this, as the majority of relations 
between trait emotions and facial expression ratings remained non-significant; 
those that were significant or marginally significant did not match the predicted 
pattern of results7. 
                                                 
 
7 Trait contempt marginally but negatively predicted contempt ratings towards loyalty scenarios, r 
= -.14, p = .096. Strangely, trait contempt significantly and negatively predicted anger face ratings 
within loyalty scenarios, r = -.17, p = .041, within authority scenarios, r = -.20, p = .022, and 
marginally within fairness scenarios, r = -.16, p = .063. However, in keeping with Hypothesis VII, 
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Hypothesis VIII: Does Trait Contempt Predict Moral Judgment of Loyalty 
and Authority Violations?  
 Hypothesis VIII predicts that trait contempt will positively relate to 
immorality judgments towards loyalty and authority violation scenarios. This will 
be tested using two multiple regressions. In both regressions, trait contempt will 
be treated as the criterion variable8, and moral judgment means from the 
following scenario types will be treated as predictor variables:  harm, fairness, 
loyalty, authority, purity, and reciprocity. The first regression will use moral 
judgments of the action as the predictor variables, while the second regression 
will use moral judgments of the person as the predictor variables. Hypothesis VIII 
will be confirmed if trait contempt is significantly predicted by loyalty and 
authority immorality judgments towards the moral-violating person, their 
behavior, or both.  
 Regression results. The regression model for immorality judgments of 
behavior was not significant, F (6, 128) = 1.33, p = .248, R2 = .06. Immorality 
judgments towards loyalty (β = -.14, p = .427) or authority (β = .15, p = .244) 
                                                                                                                                     
 
trait disgust marginally predicted disgust face ratings, r = .14, p = .068. No other relations between 
trait emotions and facial expression ratings were significant.  
8 Although the hypothesis specifies trait contempt as the predictor and the six moral violation 
types as the criterion variables, for the sake of the analysis, trait contempt was entered into the 
regression as the criterion variable. The regression  module in SPSS allows the specification of 
only one criterion variable; however, because this was a single-step model, the designation of 
predictor versus criterion is arbitrary and does not affect the direction or magnitude of uncovered 
effects, and so the reversed variable specification is acceptable. 
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violating behaviors were not significant predictors of trait contempt within this 
multiple regression model. Unexpectedly, immorality judgments of fairness 
violating behaviors negatively predicted trait contempt, (β = -.27, p = .018). 
Immorality judgments of all other categories of violating behavior did not 
significantly predict trait contempt.  
 The regression model for immorality judgments of the person was not 
significant, F (6, 130) = 1.54, p = .170, R2 = .07. Immorality judgments towards 
loyalty (β = -.20, p = .107) and authority (β = .122, p = .387) violating persons did 
not significantly predict trait contempt. Similarly to moral judgments of behavior, 
immorality judgments of fairness violating persons negatively predicted trait 
contempt (β = -.28, p = .017). No other types of moral violation behaviors 
predicted trait contempt. Thus, Hypothesis VIII was fully disconfirmed. 
 Discussion of Hypothesis VIII: Does trait contempt predict 
immorality judgments towards loyalty and authority violations?  The results 
from Hypothesis VIII indicated that trait contempt did not predict authority or 
loyalty judgments. However, it might be the case that the analytical strategy I 
proposed – multiple regression with six predictor variables – could have masked 
any legitimate association between trait contempt and loyalty/authority 
judgments. Specifically, because regressions control for the common variance 
among the predictor variables, the shared variance between the two types of 
community violations (loyalty and authority) may have been “wiped out” by the 
regression; if this is the case, the addition of the other four scenario types as 
predictors likely exacerbated this problem, particularly given that loyalty, 
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authority, and purity values are highly intercorrelated (e.g., Graham et al., 2011). 
However, although the problem of excessive common variance within the model 
can account for why both of the overall regression models had a non-significant 
R2, this is unlikely to explain the null results. Correlations from a side analysis 
indicated that neither moral judgments of authority nor loyalty violations 
significantly related to this study’s trait contempt instrument.9 Thus, a lack of a 
substantial association between trait contempt and loyalty/authority judgments is 
the most plausible explanation of the null results. In broad terms, this may provide 
further evidence that trait and state emotions function differently in their relation 
to the moral foundations.  
 Hypothesis VIII did result in one curious finding; trait contempt 
negatively associated with fairness judgments, indicating contemptuous people 
might be less likely to view non-egalitarian outcomes as immoral. Intuitively, this 
makes sense, particularly in regard to feelings of superiority and a lack of 
empathy or warmth towards others; perhaps those high in trait contempt may view 
others as unworthy or undeserving of fair/equal outcomes. Additional analyses or 
                                                 
 
9 In correlations, moral judgments of authority violations did not significantly correlate with the 
omnibus trait contempt instrument, any of its five individual subscales, or the Izard trait contempt 
instrument. In contrast, the cold feelings/avoidant action tendency subscale and Izard’s trait 
contempt instrument did negatively associate with moral judgments of loyalty violations. 
However, the omnibus trait contempt scale and all other individual subscales were not 
significantly associated with loyalty judgments.  
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future studies on this finding could prove interesting; especially considering that 
trait contempt did not correlate with fairness values in Study 1.  
Discussion: Study 2 Limitations 
 One possible limitation in Study 2 could be the nature of the moral 
scenario materials. While most of the scenarios were adapted from existing 
materials, the literature does not appear to have any validated or standardized set 
of third-person scenarios depicting moral foundation violations. As such, there is 
some risk that certain scenarios may portray violations of multiple moral domains. 
For instance, a reciprocity scenario describes a person whose friend helps them 
move, but who then refuses to help the friend move at a later time. While this is 
clearly a reciprocity violation, it also may incorporate a loyalty violation as well 
(i.e., the betrayal of a friend). Given this possible ambiguity within some 
scenarios, the inclusion of manipulation checks, which assessed specific domain 
violations, may have been beneficial; however, this was not feasible given the 
large size of the survey.  
 Another limitation of the present study was that emotion ratings within 
each moral foundation type often had only moderate internal reliabilities; this 
indicated that the three individual scenarios within each moral violation type did 
not always elicit similar magnitudes of any given emotion. If emotion ratings 
varied enough within certain moral scenario types, this could have potentially 
contributed to the pattern of results seen in Hypothesis VI, such that the CAD 
emotions tended to be elicited in statistically similar magnitudes. In combination 
with the previously described limitation of potentially having multiple moral 
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domains being violated within some scenarios, some additional analyses of the 
present study’s data would be merited to determine if this was indeed an issue. 
Additional analyses could explore emotional reactions towards each individual 
scenario. If certain scenarios could be interpreted as depicting violations of 
multiple moral domains, it may be the case that these scenarios are more likely to 
have non-significant differences between the CAD emotions; in contrast, if a 
scenario clearly only portrays the violation of one moral foundation, then the 
CAD pattern may emerge a bit more cleanly in some cases. 
 The final limitation of Study 2 was that loyalty and authority scenarios did 
not elicit strong negative emotional reactions; on average, these scenario types’ 
contempt, anger, and disgust ratings were all below the midpoint. As such, it may 
be the case that the specific scenarios used in this study did not elicit a sufficiently 
strong enough emotional reaction from participants, which may have reduced the 
ability to detect significant differences between contempt, anger, and disgust 
responses. However, it was difficult to either find or create a severe loyalty or 
authority violation scenario that did not include tangible harm or unfairness to one 
or more individuals, which would lead to the problem of the scenario not being a 
“pure” violation of one specific domain. Additionally, the potentially low severity 
of the loyalty and authority scenarios may have been unavoidable, given the 
nature of the sample. Specifically, the M-Turk participants were all from the 
United States, and the majority were politically liberal. According to previous 
studies on Moral Foundations Theory, Western liberals tend to place little value 
100 
 
on the loyalty and authority foundations, and may not even view them as moral 
violations to begin with (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012; Haidt et al., 2009).  
General Discussion 
 This thesis had several overall goals. Its overarching goal was to test 
whether the CAD model applies to moral foundations theory in regard to both 
trait and state contempt; specifically, it was predicted that both trait and state 
contempt would positively relate with the loyalty and authority foundations. 
Study 1’s primary goal was to develop a new comprehensive and construct-valid 
trait contempt instrument, and to subsequently use this new instrument to test the 
relations between trait contempt, loyalty, and authority values. This goal was 
largely met, as the comprehensive trait contempt instrument showed strong signs 
of construct validity; however, trait contempt did not match the CAD pattern in 
regard to loyalty and authority values. Study 2’s primary goal was to test whether 
state contempt is predominately elicited by loyalty and authority violations, by 
using a facial expression rating paradigm similar to that used in the original CAD 
study. The face-rating paradigm was an effective methodology; however, its 
results indicated that the CAD pattern did not apply to state contempt.  
 With the results of both Study 1 and 2 in mind, several observations can 
be made about the nature of contempt as a personality trait, as an emotion, and its 
relation to moral values and judgment. First, although this project’s findings have 
supported the view that contempt can be measured in a way that avoids the 
semantic confounds of the word “contempt,” trait contempt has still proven 
difficult to assess in a simple and practical manner. Second, although trait 
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contempt was found to be significantly associated with certain types of moral 
values and judgments, these relations did not at all correspond with the CAD 
pattern. Third, trait contempt’s general discriminant validity from trait anger and 
disgust was not fully demonstrated; this may be due in part to the 
multidimensional nature of trait contempt (see Study 1, Hypothesis III). However, 
it may also be due to limitations of the trait anger and trait disgust measures used 
in this study. Similarly, state contempt’s discriminant validity from state anger 
and disgust as a predictor of moral judgment – and perhaps even as an emotion in 
general – was difficult to confirm. Finally, as the conclusion of this paper, the 
overall applicability of the CAD model to the five moral foundations is discussed.    
Contempt can be Measured, but doing so is still Difficult 
 One of the primary challenges in this project, and indeed in almost all 
studies that assess contempt, is the ambiguous nature of the emotion (Haidt, 
2003). In order to circumvent the semantic confounds typically associated with 
directly asking people to report their “contempt,” Study 1 made use of contempt’s 
associated elicitors, cognitions, affective experiences, and action tendencies as a 
way to triangulate on this emotion. Study 2 used ratings of contempt’s facial 
expression as an alternative way to assess the emotion. Both approaches were 
successful in that they indicated that both trait and state contempt significantly 
relate to different types of moral values and judgments, albeit not in the predicted 
ways. However, contempt’s problematic ambiguity still seemed to be at play in 
both studies.  
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 Limitations of the comprehensive trait contempt instrument. In its 
current state, the comprehensive trait contempt instrument is an excellent first step 
in creating a construct-valid instrument suitable for use in future studies. 
Additional analyses of the Study 1 and 2 data can help trim the instrument to a 
considerable degree; however, even if the number of items are cut by half, the 
instrument may still contain too many items to include in most studies, unless 
such studies specifically focus on contempt. Another possibly related limitation of 
the instrument in its current form is that not all subscales contributed to the 
construct equally (as shown in the confirmatory factor analysis of Study 1, 
Hypothesis II). Therefore, simply using the means of the subscales to make an 
omnibus scale may not be theoretically appropriate, as this method uses the 
assumption that all of the subscales are weighted relatively equally. One possible 
strategy to address both of these limitations might be to take all reliable items 
from each subscale and put them into a large confirmatory factor analysis. This 
model would use these individual items as predictors of the overall latent trait 
contempt construct. This approach would be optimal in that it will provide 
information on which items best represent the trait contempt construct itself.  
These “best representative” items could then subsequently be used to create a 
short-form version of the instrument.  
 Trait contempt and discriminant validity. One limitation of this thesis 
was that trait contempt’s discriminant validity from trait anger and disgust could 
not be fully confirmed. Although trait contempt’s dimensions pertaining to 
interpersonal and emotional coldness had clear discriminant and convergent 
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validity, its dimensions pertaining to other-criticalness did not appear to have 
discriminant validity from trait anger and disgust. These results could potentially 
indicate that other-critical dimensions are not unique to trait contempt, and may 
instead relate to a general trait negativity factor. However, within the context of 
moral values and judgment, trait contempt did appear to have unique 
characteristics; it was the only trait emotion negatively associated with loyalty 
values, uniquely associated with harm/care values10 (Study 1) and uniquely 
associated with fairness judgments (Study 2). These findings may provide indirect 
support for trait contempt’s discriminant validity.  
 However, there may be an alternative explanation for the comprehensive 
trait contempt scale’s lack of discriminant validity. It might be the case that 
Izard’s trait emotion instruments were simply too shallow to provide much unique 
variance; they contained only three anger items, three contempt items, and two 
disgust items in Izard and colleagues’ trait emotion instruments, and they tended 
to assess only one dimension for each trait emotion. With this in mind, a future 
study that further explores the trait contempt scale’s discriminant validity would 
be merited, which should incorporate more comprehensive and multidimensional 
trait disgust and anger instruments, or even multiple instruments for each. Good 
                                                 
 
10 This was found in a side analysis of the Study 1 data. A multiple regression used this study’s 
trait contempt scale and Izard’s trait anger and disgust scales as predictors of harm/care values. 
Only trait contempt significantly predicted lower levels of harm/care values, with a moderate 
effect size (β = -.31, p < .001, model R2 = .25).  
104 
 
candidates for inclusion would be the Disgust Scale – Revised (Haidt, McCauley, 
& Rozin, 1994; modified by Olatunji, Haidt, McKay, & David, 2008), and the 
Trait Anger Expression Inventory (Spielberger, 1996). Discriminant validity from 
trait empathy would also be important to explore, given that the coldness and 
psychological distancing aspects of contempt are qualitatively similar to low 
levels of empathy. Thus, including the Empathic Concern and Perspective Taking 
subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983) would be 
worthwhile in future research.  
 Do facial expression ratings indicate that contempt is distinct from 
anger and disgust? Certain bodies of the emotion literature strongly indicated 
that contempt’s facial expression is unique and cross-culturally recognizable (e.g., 
Ekman et al. 1991) and that this expression can be used to assess discrete 
contempt reactions towards moral violations more accurately than the word 
“contempt” (Rozin et al., 1999). The results of Study 2 made these assumptions 
difficult to support or reject. Ratings of all three facial expressions shared a 
substantial amount of variance, and contempt was nearly always statistically 
similar to both emotions. However, it is not clear whether this indicates that the 
contempt expression was not being perceived as distinct from the other 
expressions, or whether this finding was specific to reactions towards moral 
violations. On the other hand, these results do seem to indicate that contempt is 
not merely a low-arousal variant of the anger or disgust expression (e.g., Russell, 
1991b; Wagner, 2000), given that it never had the lowest magnitude across any of 
the scenarios. Given the scope of this study, a conclusion likely cannot be drawn 
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about the validity of the contempt expression as a more direct means of assessing 
contempt reactions to social violations. This would likely require assessing 
participants’ reactions towards substantially broader categories of moral and non-
moral violations.  
 While the results could indicate something about whether the expression 
itself is unique or not, aspects of this study’s methodology or the legitimate 
pattern of the results could have contributed to the emotional similarity results just 
as plausibly. As such, the specific reason for these results was difficult to 
ascertain. It could be that this was driven by semantic confounds; the name of 
each emotion was placed above the photograph, potentially leading participants to 
conflate the emotions by using the emotion words as their decision criteria rather 
the photograph on its own. Alternatively, it could be that the general lack of 
distinction between contempt and the other emotions was driven by something 
unique about the relations between the CAD emotions and moral violations (i.e., 
that they do not strongly and uniquely associate with certain types of moral 
violations in the ways described in previous studies). Additional studies that make 
use of the contempt expression with varied measurement methods may be needed 
to make an informed conclusion (e.g., comparing categorical choice to 
quantitative ratings; comparing photo with name to photo alone).  
Contempt and Moral Values  
 Contempt’s negative relation to loyalty values is interesting, but its 
negative relation to the harm/care and fairness foundations is of even greater 
theoretical interest. Although these relations do not match the CAD pattern, they 
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make a great deal of intuitive sense. Further research on the moral values (or lack 
thereof) of contemptuous people may be particularly fruitful along these lines. It 
may be the case that trait contempt and other trait emotions associate differently 
with moral values than they do with moral judgments. This is because the pattern 
of results between trait contempt and moral values (Study 1) was not the same 
pattern as that found between trait contempt and moral judgments (Study 2). 
Specifically, trait contempt negatively related to harm/care values in Study 1, but 
negatively related to fairness judgments in Study 2. 
Future Studies with Trait Contempt 
 Given that this study’s trait contempt instrument appeared to have high 
construct validity, there are many additional types of instruments that could be 
included along with trait contempt in future studies. For instance, the five moral 
foundations are strongly related to political ideology (Graham et al., 2011), so a 
natural extension of this project could be to explore the relations between trait 
contempt and ideology. Side analyses did indicate an association between 
Crowley’s trait contempt expression instrument and economic conservatism11, so 
the inclusion of more comprehensive and multidimensional measures of ideology 
in a future study could yield interesting results.   
                                                 
 
11 Several side analyses indicated that Crowley’s trait contempt expression instrument (but not its 
subscales) significantly predicted economic conservatism; however, Izard’s trait contempt and this 
study’s trait contempt instrument (including its individual subscales) did not significantly predict 
any type of conservatism.   
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 Given that contempt involves emotional coldness, feelings of superiority, 
and a lack of empathy towards the target, it may potentially relate to social 
dominance orientation (SDO). This is because SDO is characterized by feelings of 
superiority at the group level (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). 
Additionally, persons high in SDO also tend to be emotionally cold and low in 
sympathy and empathy in terms of personality (Altemeyer, 1998; Heaven & 
Bucci, 2001). SDO relates to prejudice and discrimination (Pratto et al., 1994); 
therefore, trait contempt’s relation to these prejudice and discrimination would 
also be worthwhile investigate. In a similar fashion, trait contempt may 
potentially relate to system justification motives, because both constructs strongly 
involve negative dispositional attributions and superiority judgments (Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Additionally, some research has linked contempt 
with attitudes such as tolerance of political violence (Tausch et al., 2011); as such 
this area would be very worthwhile to explore. Given the wide range of topics that 
personality traits can be applied to, trait contempt can be studied in relation to a 
diverse array of other areas of psychology, such as prejudice, discrimination, 
dehumanization, just world beliefs, system justification, interpersonal 
relationships, clinical disorders (e.g., sociopathy or narcissism), and many more. 
Conclusion 
 The underlying question of this project was whether Rozin and colleagues’ 
CAD hypothesis (1999) mapped onto the five moral foundations, and whether 
trait emotions predict moral values in the same fashion that state emotions predict 
moral judgments in the CAD model. This project’s unique contributions come 
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from its focus on trait contempt as a predictor of moral foundation values, and its 
focus on both trait and state contempt as a predictor of judgments towards moral 
foundation violations. These had not yet been explored in similar types of studies. 
However, given that little comprehensive research has been done on contempt as 
an emotion, and barely any research had been done at all in regard to trait 
contempt, defining a valid construct for both state and trait contempt that 
incorporated more recent findings in the emotion literature was an essential first 
step to testing contempt’s relations to the five moral foundations. Given that the 
results of Study 1 and 2 both indicated relatively strong construct validity of the 
trait contempt instrument, this is perhaps the most unique contribution of this 
project. Almost no studies have explored trait contempt’s relation to other 
constructs; thus, having a valid trait contempt instrument available may open the 
door to a wide range of new research opportunities related to existing constructs 
and phenomenon in social psychology.  
 Although results relating to trait contempt as a construct were generally 
promising, the primary predictions regarding its relation to loyalty and authority 
values were not supported in the results. Trait contempt did not significantly 
associate with authority values in Study 1 after accounting for trait anger and 
disgust; nor did it significantly associate with authority judgments in Study 2. 
Although trait contempt did associate with loyalty values in Study 1, this relation 
was negative; trait contempt did not significantly associate with loyalty judgments 
in Study 2. There were also interesting negative relations between trait contempt 
and harm/care values in Study 1 and fairness judgments in Study 2, the results 
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across both studies strongly indicated that contemptuous people are not more 
likely to have authority or loyalty values, nor are they more likely to judge 
authority violations harshly. If anything, the opposite appeared to be the case. 
Broadly, these results indicated that the CAD model does not apply in regard to 
trait emotions and the moral foundations.  
 Finally, the results of this project may cast doubt on the conclusions of the 
CAD study (Rozin et al., 1999). Although moral foundations theory was primarily 
derived from the moral taxonomy used in the original CAD study (Shweder’s 
three ethics; Shweder et al., 1997), the results indicated that the CAD model 
generally does not neatly map onto the five moral foundations, particularly in 
regard to contempt. Furthermore, this project’s findings conflicted with the 
proposition that specific categories of moral violations elicit discrete emotional 
responses; instead, it appeared that most moral violations elicit multiple negative 
emotional responses, which are often (but not always) similar in magnitude. 
However, in summation, the results of this project indicate that contempt, and 
particularly trait contempt, may have a unique influence on other types of moral 
values and judgments which do not fit the CAD pattern, which is a promising 
avenue for future research.  
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Table 1. 
Correlation table used in Study 1, Hypothesis II:  Does each subscale load onto to 
a latent trait contempt construct?   
 Cold 
Feelings & 
Avoidant 
Action 
Tendencies 
Superiority & 
Social 
Standards 
Negative 
Dispositional 
Attributions 
Psycho-
logical 
Distancing 
Derogatory 
Action 
Tendencies 
Cold 
Feelings & 
Avoidant 
Action 
Tendencies 
1     
Superiority & 
Social 
Standards 
.413* 1    
Negative 
Dispositional 
Attributions 
.672* .498* 1   
Psycho-
logical 
Distancing 
.747* .518* .690* 1  
Derogatory 
Action 
Tendencies 
.562* .470* .527* .552* 1 
Note. * = correlations were significant at p < .001. Correlations were not rounded 
to two decimals in order to duplicate the table used in the confirmatory factor 
analysis. N = 503 after listwise deletion.  
122 
 
Table 2.  
Parameter estimates for the confirmatory factor analysis in Study 1, Hypothesis II: 
Does each subscale load onto to a latent trait contempt construct?   
Parameter Loadings SE Error Variance 
Λ δ ζ ζ δ R² 
Psychological 
Distancing .87 .04 .29 .04 .72 
Coldness & Avoidant 
AT .83 .04 .28 .04 .71 
Negative Attributions .75 .04 .30 .03 .65 
Derogatory AT .69 .04 .63 .03 .43 
Superiority & Social 
Standards .49 .04 .41 .03 .37 
 
Error Correlations δ Error Covariance (θδ) 
Coldness/Avoidant & Psychological 
Distancing .03 .06 
Cold/Avoidant & Superiority / Social 
Standards .02 .03 
Superiority/Social Standards & 
Derogatory AT .03 -.08 
Note. Confirmatory factor analysis results report t statistics as opposed to p 
values. Each path and error covariance was significant at p < .05. 
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Table 3. Correlation table of the variables used in the principle components 
described in Study 1, Hypothesis III: Does the comprehensive trait contempt 
instrument have convergent and discriminant validity? 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11   
(1) Negative Attributions 1.00           
(2) Psychological Distancing .684 1.00          
(3) Derogatory Actions .515 .545 1.00         
(4) Superiority & Standards .496 .509 .474 1.00        
(5) Coldness and Avoidance .661 .741 .552 .398 1.00       
(6) Comprehensive Contempt .832 .871 .779 .692 .842 1.00      
(7) Izard’s Trait Contempt .477 .558 .560 .468 .586 .661 1.00     
(8) Izard’s Trait Anger .430 .467 .627 .516 .501 .632 .614 1.00    
(9) Izard’s Trait Disgust .376 .423 .469 .384 .487 .534 .615 .618 1.00   
(10) Crowley’s Coldness .454 .507 .320 .204 .700 .551 .437 .333 .316 1.00  
(11) Crowley’s Expression .360 .472 .364 .189 .600 .502 .455 .317 .361 .567 1.00    
 
Note. Listwise deletion was used in these correlations (N = 472). All correlations 
were significant at p < .001. 
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Table 4. 
Correlation table used for the path model described in Study 1, Hypothesis V: 
Does this study’s trait contempt instrument predict loyalty and authority values 
better than Izard’s and Crowley’s? 
 Loyalty 
Values 
Authority 
Values 
Izard’s 
Trait 
Contempt 
Crowley’s 
Trait 
Contempt 
Study 1 
Trait 
Contempt 
Loyalty 1     
Authority .674*** 1    
Izard TC .008 -.008 1   
Crowley 
TC 
-.012 -.044 .527*** 1  
Study 1 TC -.103* -.083m .671*** .587*** 1 
Note.  * = p < .05, *** = p < .001, m = marginally significant at p < .10. N  = 460 
after listwise deletion.  
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Table 5.  
Facial expression magnitude ratings for contempt, anger, and disgust within each 
moral scenario category, as referred to in Study 2, Hypothesis VI. 
Scenario 
Type 
Facial Expression Rating 
Contempt Anger Disgust 
M 95% CI M 95% CI M 95% CI 
Harm 4.47a1 [4.24, 4.70] 4.75
a1 [4.56, 4.93] 4.53
a1 [4.33, 4.74] 
Fairness 5.04ab2 [4.76, 5.32] 5.31
a2 [5.07, 5.54] 4.77
b1 [4.49, 5.05] 
Reciprocity 4.91ab123 [4.65, 5.17] 4.92
a12 [4.68, 5.17] 4.41
b1 [4.14, 4.68] 
Loyalty 3.68a [3.38, 3.97] 3.51
a3 [3.20, 3.82] 3.42
a2 [3.11, 3.73] 
Authority 4.28a14 [4.01, 4.55] 4.09
a4 [3.82, 4.37] 3.73
a2 [3.44, 4.03] 
Purity 4.46a134 [4.16, 4.76] 3.85
b34 [3.54, 4.17] 6.08
c [5.90, 6.26] 
Note. Within-scenario comparisons are notated with superscripted letters (a, b, c) 
across each row. Any means within a single row which share a superscript letter 
are not significantly different. Between-scenario comparisons are notated with 
superscripted numbers (1-4) down each column. Any means within a single 
column which share a superscript number are not significantly different. Means 
between columns and/or between rows were not compared.  
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Table 6.  
Correlation table used to test Study 2, Hypothesis VII: Can facial expression 
ratings towards moral violations be used as a measure of trait emotions? The 
answer is “no.” 
 Trait 
Contempt 
Trait 
Anger 
Trait 
Disgust 
Contempt 
Face 
Anger 
Face 
Disgust 
Face 
Trait 
Contempt 
1      
Trait 
Anger 
.688* 1     
Trait 
Disgust 
.509* .622* 1    
Contempt 
Face 
-.108 .046 .072 1   
Anger 
Face 
-.079 .016 .090 .596* 1  
Disgust 
Face 
-.156M -.007 .037 .533* .789* 1 
Note. Asterisk (*) indicates significance at p < .001. An “M” superscript indicates 
marginal significance at p = .071. Correlations without superscripts were not 
significant. N per cell varied (134-168) due to pairwise deletion.   
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Figure 1. Two photos of the contempt facial expression (Getty Images, 2014; 
Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988). The contempt expression is characterized by a 
unilateral smirk and tightening of the lip, i.e. Ekman’s action unit 14 (Ekman, 
2007; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). (Photos redacted due to copyright).  
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Figure 2. Scree plot from the initial exploratory factor analysis; Study 1, 
Hypothesis I. The plot indicates that five factors was the point of discontinuity.   
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Figure 3. Results of the confirmatory factor analysis; Study 1, Hypothesis II. All 
five subscales/factors significantly contributed to a latent trait contempt construct, 
with moderate to strong effect sizes. All paths were significant at p < .05.    
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Figure 4. Path model results for Study 1, Hypothesis V. The top figure shows 
paths to loyalty values (model 1), and the bottom figure shows paths to authority 
values (model 2) values. In model 1, all three paths were significant predictors of 
loyalty values at p < .05. In model 2, all three paths were significant predictors of 
authority values at p < .05. In both cases, this study’s trait contempt instrument 
was the strongest predictor; however, contrary to predictions, the direction of each 
relation was negative.  
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Figure 5. Photos used as dependent variables in the facial expression rating task 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 1988). From left to right, these expressions depict 
contempt, anger, and disgust. (Photos redacted due to copyright) 
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Figure 6. Graph of facial expression rating means, group by moral scenario type. 
This summarizes the results for Hypothesis VI in Study 2: Does the CAD 
hypothesis apply to the moral foundations?   
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Appendix A 
Trait Contempt Questionnaire 
Increased Awareness of Social Standard Violations Subscale 
Prompt: How often do you notice strangers or acquaintances doing the following 
in your day-to-day life?  
1-A) Not behaving how they should 
 
1-B) Behaving better than I expect them to (R) 
 
1-C) Being incompetent at what they are doing (for example: their job, 
schoolwork, tasks, etc.) 
 
1-D) Doing their job better than I expected them to (R) 
 
1-E) Being inconsiderate 
 
1-F) Being considerate of other people (R) 
 
1-G) Acting inappropriately  
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1-H) Breaking an important “unwritten rule”  
 
Frequent Inferiority-Superiority Judgments Subscale 
Prompt: Compared to you, how often do you see strangers and acquaintances 
acting or being… 
2-A) Stupid  
 
2-C) Incompetent   
 
2-D) Careless   
 
2-E) Irresponsible   
 
2-F) Smart (R)  
 
2-H) Capable (R) 
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2-I) Careful (R) 
 
2-J) Responsible (R) 
 
Increased Negative Dispositional Attributions Subscale 
Prompt: In your day-to-day life, how often do you find yourself doing the 
following?  
3-A) I judge others positively (R) 
 
3-B) Before judging someone, I think about what circumstances might have 
caused their behavior (R)  
 
3-C) I assume that someone’s good behavior reflects something about their 
character (R)  
 
3-D) I judge others negatively  
 
3-E) If someone is in a bad situation, I think that it’s probably their own 
fault  
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3-F) I assume someone’s bad behavior reflects something about their 
personality 
 
3-G) I make an effort to give people the benefit of the doubt (R) 
 
3-H) I assume that someone is a good person (R) 
 
Derogatory Action Tendencies: 
Prompt: How often do you do the following behaviors in your day to day life? 
4-A) I talk about other peoples’ bad qualities 
 
4-B) At the end of the day, I feel the need to unload about all the stupid stuff 
I saw other people do 
 
4-C) I avoid talking about people behind their back (R) 
 
4-D) I complain about people that I don’t like 
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4-E) I avoid being critical of others (R) 
 
4-F) I talk about peoples’ good qualities (R) 
 
4-G) I feel like rolling my eyes at somebody 
 
4-H) I feel like cursing at somebody under my breath 
 
Socially Aversive Action Tendencies: 
4-A) If someone I don’t like is coming my way, I ignore them 
 
4-B) I make an effort to be polite with people who I don’t like (R) 
 
4-C) I shut people out when they disappoint me 
 
4-D) I give people the “cold shoulder”  
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4-E) I take efforts to include everyone in big group activities or outings, even 
if I don’t particularly like them (R)  
 
4-F) I treat people in a cold or “icy” way 
 
4-G) I treat people warmly (R) 
 
4-H) I drop people from my social circle 
 
Cold Feelings: (intense or “icy” feelings of dislike) 
Prompt: How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following statements? 
5-A) Others consider me a cold person 
 
5-B) Others consider a warm person (R) 
 
5-C) It doesn’t take much for me to dislike someone   
 
5-D) There are very few people that I strongly dislike (R) 
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5-E) It would be hard for me to come up with a list of people that I loathe (R) 
 
5-F) I have cold or “icy” feelings towards many people 
 
5-G) I feel disdain towards the “average person” 
 
5-H) I don’t detest anybody (R) 
 
Psychological distancing: (quick to lose empathy, warmth, or respect for 
others) 
5-A) It is easy for me to lose respect for a person  
 
5-B) It is easy for me to “forgive and forget” (R)  
 
5-C) I have little sympathy for people who can’t get their act together  
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5-D) I expect most people to disappoint me 
 
 5-E) I have low expectations for people. 
 
5-F) I like the majority of people that I meet (R)  
 
5-G) People have to really screw up to earn my disapproval (R) 
 
5-H) If someone disappoints me, I am very willing to give them another 
chance (R) 
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Appendix B 
Example of the facial expression rating task. 
(Photos redacted due to copyright) 
Scenario: A teenage girl gets into an argument with her father after she refuses to 
do a small household chore that he asked her to do. During the argument, the 
teenaged girl curses at her father, to his face. 
Instructions: Imagine that you actually witnessed this event. Please rate how 
strongly you would feel each of the following emotions towards the teenage girl 
described in the scenario. If you would not feel any emotion at all – or if you 
would feel an emotion not listed below – please choose “not at all” for all three 
emotions. Do not be concerned about how often you give any particular 
expression a high or low rating throughout this task.      
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Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the above scenario.  
1) How immoral is this behavior? 
  
2) How immoral is the person who engaged in this behavior?  
 
3) Regardless of moral or immoral, were the teenage girl’s actions 
“conventional”—in other words, did he do something that people typically 
do or consider appropriate in our society? 
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Appendix C 
The moral scenarios used in facial expression rating task.  
(Quotation marks, references, and page numbers did not appear in the actual 
survey)  
Harm/Care scenarios:  
Richard sees a stray dog in an alleyway. He walks up to the stray dog and “kicks” 
it “in the head, hard”  
(Graham & Haidt, 2012, p. 28).  
Jill makes “cruel” and insulting “remarks to an overweight man about his 
appearance” in order to hurt his feelings.     
(Graham & Haidt, 2012, p.28).  
Bill purposefully stomps “on an anthill, killing thousands of ants” (Graham et al., 
2009, p. 1045).  
Fairness (non-reciprocity): 
During an election, a local election worker “throws out a box of ballots” in order 
“to help her favored candidate win” (Graham & Haidt, 2012, pg. 28).  
John, a local business owner, only hires white men for new positions, even when 
women and racial minority applicants are significantly more qualified (Graham & 
Haidt, 2012).   
Bob goes to a poker game, where people play cards for money. Bob cheats in 
order to win most of the money (Graham & Haidt, 2012).  
Reciprocity:  
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Jason unofficially works at a construction job and gets paid $25 per hour in cash. 
Because there is no record of him being employed or having an income, he also 
collects Medicaid, food stamps, and unemployment benefits.   
In a college class, Amy is assigned to a 4-person team for a big group project. She 
skips all group meetings and does not make any contribution to the project. 
However, she still gets an “A+” because everyone else in the group worked extra 
hard.  
Bill has an acquaintance that helped him move into a new apartment last month. 
Later, the acquaintance asks Bill to return the favor and help him move into a new 
apartment. However, Bill refuses to help (Graham & Haidt, 2012).   
In-Group/Loyalty: 
Will is about to inherit a very large amount of money. In order to avoid paying 
estate taxes on it, Will decides to renounce his US citizenship and “become a 
citizen of another country” 
 (adapted from Graham & Haidt, 2012, p.28).  
“A woman is cleaning out her closet, and finds her old American flag. She doesn't 
want it anymore, so she cuts it up into pieces and uses the rags to clean her 
bathroom” (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993, p. 617).  
Steve is a US citizen. He calls into a radio show hosted in France, which asks for 
audience opinions. He harshly criticizes US citizens, culture, and government, and 
praises France for being a superior country.    
(adapted from Graham & Haidt, 2012).  
Authority: 
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Robert is in the audience when the President of the United States is making an 
official speech. Robert interrupts the speech by heckling and yelling insults at the 
President.  
(loosely based on Graham & Haidt, 2012) 
A teenage girl gets into an argument with her father after she refuses to do a small 
household chore he asked her to do. During the argument, the teenaged girl curses 
at her father, to his face. 
 (loosely adapted from Graham & Haidt, 2012). 
Jane is a university student. She is texting during one of her classes, instead of 
listening. When the professor asks her to stop texting, she raises her middle finger 
at the professor.  
 (Graham & Haidt, 2012).   
Purity: 
(Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993, p. 617).  
“A family's dog was killed by a car in front of their house. They had heard that 
dog meat was delicious, so they cut up the dog's body and cooked it and ate it for 
dinner”   
“A man goes to the supermarket once a week and buys a dead chicken. But before 
cooking the chicken, he has sexual intercourse with it. Then he cooks it and eats 
it.”  
 “A brother and sister like to kiss each other on the mouth. When nobody is 
around, they find a secret hiding place and kiss each other on the mouth, 
passionately.” 
